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1. Political Aspects
1.1  Introduction: Debate priorities in Greece
1.1.1  The overriding importance of convergence
The Greek debate on EMU is heavily influenced by the overriding political will
to bring Greece into Euroland and, also, by the conviction that the whole
framework has to be taken as „given“. Therefore direct references and real
discussion about the institutional structure, the politics and the problems of
EMU itself are not very frequent in the Greek political and academic debate.
Usually the debate is centred around the implications of EMU for the Greek
economy, for the politics of nominal and real convergence and, somehow less,
for the Greek political system and for the overall place of Greece within Europe.
The questions addressed are accordingly whether Greece will attain the goal of
entering Euroland, why there have been delays in accomplishing the Maastricht-
criteria, leaving Greece for the time being outside Euroland or whether the
progress achieved is sustainable.
Despite this bias official statements and academic contributions contain several
references to the nature and problems of EMU itself. Among the issues
addressed are
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- the implications of the ECB independence for the EU political system
(democratic control)
- problems associated with the general economic policy orientation in the EU,
- the importance of the fiscal discipline and the Stability Pact for the Union as
a whole,
- the impact of EMU on unemployment,
- the distributional effects of EMU etc.
Additionally there has been some discussion in academic circles about the
desirability of EMU for the Union and, of course, Greece as well as about
alternative options. In the camp of the moderate left academics EMU has been
criticised as a source of unemployment in Europe. Part of the critique has taken
the theory of optimum currency areas as a theoretical point of departure (for
example L. Katseli, 1992), other have preferred keynesian arguments,
emphasising the recessionist bias of the whole EMU-construction (example
Pelagidis, 1998). In the context of the Optimum Currency Areas EMU, as
agreed in Maastricht, implies a loss of national monetary and, indeed, fiscal
policy. One of the criticisms is that member countries will not be able to respond
to adverse economic shocks through changes in national monetary policy or the
nominal exchange rate or a flexible fiscal policy. It is then argued that
asymmetric country-specific shocks will result in a recession and a surge in
unemployment.
In reality, the exchange rates only conditionally can help to cope with adverse
economic developments and country – specific shocks. Fiscal policy instruments
are of questionable usefulness if the problems arise from the supply side of the
economy.
Last but not least the critics overlook the benefits to be derived from eliminating
the exchange rate risk and increased credibility of the monetary policy. Lower
risk and increased credibility are expected to influence interest rates and to
encourage firms to produce closer to the Greek markets. It is therefore likely that
EMU entry will be favourable to growth and employment in the Greek
economy. In more political terms, N. Christodoulakis sees Greece becoming a
„gaining“ instead of being a „losing“ society  [see for example statements of the
deputy finance minister N. Christodoulakis in an Interview to the Kathimerini,
5.12.1999).
In the 90s a broad consensus between the major political forces in Greece has
been established, that Greece should join EMU3 (Euroland) at the earliest
possible date.
The dominant aspect remains however, whether Greece will achieve the
declared goal to enter Euroland in 2000. Political reasons seem to play a crucial
role. The political leadership is convinced that only through the EMU
participation can the country have a say in important community policy sectors
„on an equal footing“ with the other member states as Prime Minister K. Simitis
repeatedly argues. Participation will also send a clear signal to third countries
that Greece is indeed a part of the European gravity centre. Prestige may also
play a role: “If we miss the opportunity in 2001 we will have to wait for EMU
enlargement and the arrival of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. This
would effectively mean losing the advantages of 20 years of EU membership”,
as was pointed out by the minister of finance, Mr Yannos Papantoniou
(Financial Times, 15.11.96. See also the country report on Greece in Johannes
Pakaslahti : Does the EMU threaten European Welfare? Working paper , June
1997, p. 47.).
1.1.2  EU, EMU and the interest groups in Greece
Interest groups in Greece have probably not been as influential over Greek
policy towards EU and EMU as their counterparts have been e.g. in Denmark.
Partly this has been so because of the relative weakness of interest groups in
matters of fundamental importance for the country; partly it reflects the
overriding political will to participate to the EC in the 70s and to the EMU in the
90s. Resistance however has been noticeable and in many cases successful,
whenever concrete measures of adjustment to the new environment had to be
taken. Successful resistance in connection with a strong populism caused
stagnation during the 80s and early 90s. Nowadays, the emerging picture of
Greek policy towards EMU, under both liberal-conservative and socialist
governments, is of a state determined not to be forced by established interests
out of the economic core of Western Europe- the Euroland. As L. Tsoukalis
assesses, adjustment
“has been difficult and rather painful for Greece. Resistance to
change from organised groups proved powerful enough to delay
the process of adjustment for many years. The forces of reform \
modernisation have now taken the upper hand, although there is
still much that needs to be done” (“Greece: Like any other
European Country? “, in The National Interest, Number 55, Spring
1999).
The following references to the state of convergence in Greece may facilitate a
better understanding of public opinion and political and academic debate.
1.1.3  The state of convergence
With the March 1998 decision to devaluate the hitherto hard drachma by 14%
and to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as a prelude for joining the
Euro-club by 2001, Greece had to accelerate the nominal convergence reforms
as well as structural adjustment. This latter meant an aggressive streamlining of
an inefficient and overgrown public sector; liberalising the labour market and
reforming the social security system in order to make employment more flexible
and increase the retirement age; partial privatisation of state owned companies
including state controlled banks; abolition, merger or even closure of
overlapping state agencies or non-viable enterprises; and modernisation of the
capital and money markets.
During the last few years before the Greek economy has been displaying steady
progress in terms of both nominal and real convergence with the rest of the EU
economies. Table 1 gives an overview of the progress achieved (IMF, Nov.
1999).
On the “nominal side” public finances moved towards eliminating deficits. On
end 1999 the Greek economy is on the road towards accomplishing the
Maastricht-criteria for accession to the Euroland. With respect to four of these -
fiscal deficit, exchange rate, long term interest rate, debt- the criteria are already
satisfied. The General Government deficit in 1999 is at 1.5 percent of GDP a
Maastricht requirement of 3 percent. In September 1999 the year-on-year
increase of the harmonised CPI was 1.5 percent.
The most noticeable and significant development is that, whereas from 1980 to
1993 the Greek economy was almost stagnating, in the last three years it has
grown at a rate significantly higher than the average EU rate. The Greek
economy continues to grow, despite the Kosovo conflict and a highly destructive
earthquake.
A National Action Plan for the transition from the drachma to the Euro has been
worked out and is currently implemented with an aim to minimise the problems
of transition. The private sector, especially the banking and business
community, makes its own preparations. The Federation of Greek Banks, for
example, has been in constant contact with the Banking Federation of the
European Union and is currently establishing a training and seminar centre for
its employees.  The Federation of the Greek Industries has been labouring along
the same path.
One crucial problem remains unemployment, which stands in the range of 10-11
percent of the labour force. Although employment is growing steadily this is
largely explained by the fact that the labour force is also growing fast as a result
of large immigration and increasing participation.
On the structural front several measures have been implemented. On this front
however the government meets with hard resistance on the part of organised
labour in the public sector and other vested interests as the conflict about
reforming Olympic Airways, the ailing state carrier, has shown.
Roughly up to mid 1998 a wave of social unrest in Greece was clearly targeted
at EMU, which was made responsible for several undesirable measures taken by
the Simitis government. At a major demonstration by civil servants and bank
employees held in Athens at the end of November 1996 the dominant slogan
was “no to Maastrcht and its criteria” (L’Echo 29.11.96).
Until 1997 the overall impression was that despite certain positive measures
taken to comply with Maastricht, the government would hardly overcome wide
resistance by organised groups against stabilisation (“austerity”) and structural
adjustment. The Financial Times e.g. stated that events were “fuelling
scepticism about Greece’s chances of reaching the targets” (15.11.96). By now,
perceptions have changed dramatically. It is widely anticipated that Greece will
be admitted into the euro area by June next year so that it can adopt the single
currency on 1 January 2001
Despite resistance, progress was steady on the macroeconomic as well as on the
structural front. As John Spraos has commented on an IMF-Report (see
Statement by John Spraos, executive director for Greece, October 20,1999
attached to IMF: Greece, Staff Report for the 1999 Article IV Consultation, No
99\131, November 1999), the government, in keeping with Greek tradition and
preferences, has followed a gradual course comprising consensual elements. The
consensual policy stance slowed down reform progress particularly in the labour
markets, but it did not halt them.
Table 1
Greece: Selected Economic Indicators
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Real economy
(change in %)
GDP
2.1 2.4 3.2 3.7 3.3
EU harmonised
consumer inflation
(period average)
… 7.9 5.4 4.5 2.3
Unemployment (in
%)
10.0 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.3
Investment 18.7 19.4 20.1 21.8 22.8
Public Finance
(general
government, in %
of GDP)
Overall balance -10.6 -7.5 -4.0 -2.4 -1.7
Primary balance 2.3 4.5 5.7 6.7 7.0
Debt 110.1 112.2 109.5 106.1 102.1
Interest rates
(year average)
12-month treasury
bill rate
15.5 12.8 10.3 11.5 8.8
Balance of
payments
(national
accounts, in % of
GDP)
Trade balance -12.8 -12.6 -12.3 -12.7 -12.5
Current account
balance
-2.4 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.3
Real effective rate
(1990=100)
110.2 115.0 116.1 112.9 113.1
Source: Data provided by the Greek authorities; and IMF staff estimates
and projections.
1.2  Opinion polls
1.2.1  Eurobarometer and National polls (Sources)
In order to illuminate the latest trends of Greek public opinion towards the EU,
and especially the degree of citizen support for the single currency, we took into
account the findings of a survey carried out by MRB Hellas, a reliable national
private institution1. Since 1987, MRB Hellas systematically performs public
opinion surveys, with a view to tracking the shifts in Greek public attitude and
state of mind, regarding current evolutions in the political and economic field.
The most recent survey was conducted on May 1999 and includes a set of
questions, concerning a range of issues, such as the perceived state of the Greek
economy, the popularity of the government, of the opposition and of other
political leaders, the Kosovo crisis and finally the European Union and the June
1999 European Parliament elections. 2000 persons aged over 18, have been
sampled, in nine different geographic departments of the country, in a way that
the representative value of the final outcome is being ensured. We will focus on
the section of the opinion poll, which inquires about the attitudes of the Greek
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citizens towards the EU and the Euro, comparing, where possible, the results
with those of the 51st Eurobarometer Report of spring 1999.
We should stress in advance that the results of the survey are strongly affected
by the war in Kosovo, which began in the end of March 1998. Other events,
such as the institutional crisis in the EU and the resignation of the Commission
on 15 March 1999, no doubt, will also have influenced public opinion.
1.2.2  Comparing results: The attitudes towards EU in 1999
On the whole, we observe a significant shift in the feelings of Greek citizens,
concerning the process of European integration; public opinion towards the
European Union is manifestly less positive on May 1999, than it was at the time
of the previous survey on June 1998.
22,8 % of Greeks are likely to be wary of the EU, while the percentage of
citizens that tends to regard the EU as something indifferent to them, stands at
14,1%. This indicates a considerable increase of negative feelings (at around 5
%), compared to the respective levels reported on June 1998. The proportion of
people who express a willingness to protest against the EU has also increased
from 4% to 7%.
A drop in support levels for the European Union matches the increase in
negative attitudes. A considerable decrease in public’s interest in the process of
European integration is noted (- 11,6 %, since June 1998). At the same time the
proportion of respondents that declare their will to participate more actively in
the functions and procedures of the European Union stands at 4,1 %, which
represents a drop of 12, 6 percentage points, compared to June 1998. More than
one in four people (26 %) have positive expectations about the ongoing process
of European integration, while the percentage of citizens that feel enthusiastic
about the idea of a United Europe remains relatively stable at 4,4 %.
This decrease in support levels should be mainly attributed to the developments
in Kosovo and to the way that the crisis was dealt with by the EU. The results of
the same poll, regarding the war in Yugoslavia, provide evidence of the
extensive opposition of Greek public opinion to NATO’s military operations
against Yugoslavia. (90 % of the respondents express their total disagreement to
NATO bombings). The drop in confidence could also be partly interpreted as a
reaction to the institutional crisis in the EU.
Despite the increase in the level of negative feelings, an overall evaluation of the
responses reveals that the majority of citizens in Greece tend to be favourably
disposed towards the EU and share positive expectations about the European
perspective of the country. The proportion of the population that expresses
positive feelings outnumbers the proportion of the population with negative
feelings.  (hope 26,2 %, interest 27,1 %, against a percentage of 28,1 % that is
rather distrustful of the EU).
A direct comparison of those findings with the results of the last
Eurobaromater’s public opinion survey of spring 1999 is not methodologically
possible, due to the different form and content of the questions posed.
An inspection of the respective chapter of the Eurobarometer Report, which
measures the support levels for EU in each Member State, confirms that there is
a widespread negative trend. In the spring of 1999, 49% of Europeans regard
their country’s membership to the European Union as a good thing, a percentage
lower than that reported in the autumn of 1998, when 54% of people supported
their country’s membership to the EU. The Report attributes the drop in
confidence to the developments in March 1999, when the Commission resigned
after the Committee of Independent Experts published its first report on
allegations regarding fraud, mismanagement and nepotism at the European
Commission. The war in Kosovo is also mentioned as a further factor, that may
have influenced public opinion. It is not surprising to observe that the largest
drop in support levels is noted in Greece (- 13). As stated earlier, the level of
opposition to NATO’s military operations in Kosovo, was much higher in
Greece than in other European countries.
On the other hand, the results of the Report suggest that in Greece more than
half of the public feel that their country has benefited from European Union
membership, while less than a quarter of the population holds negative views.
Thus, despite the latest negative trends, Greece remains a country where the
benefits from participation of the country in the EU, are considered to be high
by its citizens, compared to other EU Members.
1.2.3  Comparing results: The attitudes towards the single currency in
1999
MRB Hellas has measured public support for the Euro in Greece, since June
1998. At the time of the last survey the euro has been in operation for five
months. Greece hasn’t succeeded in reaching the Maastricht criteria, required for
EMU membership by January 1999. The Greek authorities are currently
following stability-oriented economic policies, aiming at qualifying for
European Economic and Monetary Union by mid-2000.
Support for the single currency in Greece is less solid in May 1999 than in
December 1999.  55% of Greek citizens are of the view that the entry in EMU
should be the primary goal of the country, while the respective percentage stood
at 64,2 % in December 1998. The proportion of people that doesn’t regard
participation in EMU as a top-priority for the country has increased from 18,8 %
to 26,4 %. 12.2 % of the respondents seem to lack an opinion on the matter.
The majority of Greek citizens (66,8 %) share the belief that Greece will
succeed in fulfilling the Maastricht’s criteria, which will lead to EMU
participation by 2001, while 18,9 % of Greeks hold the opposite view.
According to the findings of Eurobarometer, concerning the support for the
single currency in Member States in the spring of 1999, 61 % of EU citizens
support the Euro, while 28 % oppose it. This is slightly lower than in the autumn
of 1998, when support stood at 64 % and opposition at 25 %.
There are no reliable statistical data on what public opinion in Greece thinks
about the crucial issue of the independence and the accountability of the
European Central Bank. Given the fact that most of the discussion about the
single currency in Greece has been conducted in national terms, we assume that
the public opinion is not very well informed on that particular issue.
EU-wide, support tends to be considerably higher in the countries that
introduced the Euro on 1 January 1999 (68 %) than in the four “pre-in” countries
(35%). Although support levels for euro dropped significantly in Greece, it is
interesting to point out that people in Greece continue to be more likely to
support the single currency than people in the UK, Denmark and Sweden (the
three other countries outside the Euro-zone). Support levels for the Euro in
Greece remain above the average level in the EU.
1.3  Official (government, parties, unions, Central Bank) and academic
positions and comments concerning institutional and other  EMU-issues
1.3.1  Introduction. The fora of political and expert debate
Economic and Monetary Union being a drastic regime change there are
widespread implications for government, as well as for the activities of market
participants and private and public.  Not surprisingly the authorities have
organised a broad information campaign to make the public familiar with the
problems associated with the new monetary-economic regime.
Apart from information campaigns addressing the general public, specific
“policy communities” in Greece are involved in processes of opinion exchange
and expert meetings thus gaining insights into a wider range of EMU-related
policy issues. E.g. the Bank of Greece organised a series of lectures by
specialists from EU central banks and treasuries. The lectures were delivered in
Athens from October 12, 1998 to May 28, 1999. The meetings addressed
questions concerning the monetary strategy in stage three of the EMU, the
Stability Pact etc. (The contributions are contained in a volume published by the
Bank of Greece and edited by the Vice-governor of the Bank N. Garganas
Framing Macroeconomic Policy in EMU and the international financial
architecture, Athens, 1999).
In February 1999 EMU became also an issue during the parliamentary debate
preceding the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
1.3.2  Fiscal discipline. The Stability Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact per se has not been really discussed and therefore
questioned in the Greek EMU-debate. The reason is probably that Greece has
the status of a "non participating country" as defined in the Growth and Stability
Pact. This status is associated with some differences vis-à-vis participating
countries in performance (non participating countries are still trying to achieve a
"high degree of sustainable convergence" which participating countries are
supposed to have already achieved or have indeed achieved), consequences
(sanctions) and, perhaps, influence in monetary affairs. It may be said that the
subtle distinction between "convergence programmes" and "stability
programmes" reflects these differences.
However, the authorities have not overlooked the probable implications of the
Pact for present, pre-entry Greek economic policy, since they understand that
the public finances have to rise to a situation of sustainable fiscal discipline as
the Pact has put it in concrete terms for the future.
Still, in the earlier mentioned series of lectures organised by the Bank of Greece
the Stability Pact has been the object of a several lecturers. Ron Keller,  e.g.
discussed the historical origins of the Stability and Growth Pact, its institutional
and procedural aspects and the logic underlying the Pact. He argued that the Pact
had its roots in the experience which industrial countries have had with
exchange rate coordination. According to Keller, attempts to stabilise exchange
rates and monetary conditions fail if they are not supported by convergence of
economic policy. This lesson from historical experience helps explain why the
Maastricht Treaty set out convergence criteria that need to be fulfilled and why
the Stability and Growth Pact was adopted.
Judging from the debates generated by the lectures, the academic community in
Greece seems to follow the same path of reasoning.
For Greece the Stability and Growth Pact represents an additional challenge
beyond that posed by Maastricht. Nicholas Garganas, deputy governor of the
Bank of Greece sees in this regard three important and interrelated issues:
First, to achieve now a sound budgetary position consistent with
the Stability and Growth Pact. A speedy reduction in the still high
debt-to GDP ratio is part of this task. Another part is ensuring that
the automatic stabilisers will be able to play their role. Second,
Greece’s ability to respond to “asymmetric” shocks has to be
strengthened. Third, the challenge of stepping up the structural
reforms should be stepped up to secure Greece’s smooth
participation in the euro. (In an Address on “Integrating Greece
into the Euro Area: The challenges ahead” at the “Athens Summit
1999”, 18 September 1999).
Reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 per cent will not be easy and is heavily
dependent upon deep structural reforms (f.e. upon reforming the social security
system, speeding up privatisation and using the proceeds to reduce the debt
stock, reducing tax evasion and reforming the wider public sector).
Again according to N. Garganas, it is also important that in the constrained
environment of the Stability and Growth Pact the government regains  “room for
macroeconomic manoeuvring” in case that unfavourable circumstances occur,
f.e. asymmetric shocks.
Certainly, as Garganas argues, asymmetric shocks are already relatively
infrequent and they will become even more so once Greece joins the euro area:
“The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework will reduce the
likelihood of policy-induced shocks (such as disturbances
originating from reckless fiscal behaviour), which in the past have
been an important source of country-specific shocks. Moreover,
the increasing openness and trade integration of EMU members
will further blur the economic importance of national boundaries,
thereby reducing the national specificity of economic
disturbances…..To argue that the incidence of country specific
disturbances will diminish is not, however, to say that such shocks
will disappear altogether” (ibid).
1.3.3  Independence and democratic control of the ECB
EMU is not simply a matter of economics. It also raises important political
questions. They are associated with the institutional innovation of a
supranational and independent ECB. The problem of the democratic and,
indeed, social deficit of EMU has been again and again raised in the Greek
political debate. In 1999 PM K. Simitis grasped the opportunity of the
parliamentary debate preceding the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam to
repeat his government’s position on the political and social aspects of Maastricht
and the developments thereafter. The PM understands for example the Treaty of
Amsterdam as
“an important step in the effort to redress the deficits of the Treaty
of Maastricht, deficits regarding the democratic function of the
institutions, the social policy, the shaping of new policies. The
focal point now shifts from economic regulations to social
provisions. The citizens of the European Union become the centre
of attention. Our main objective was to promote the social
dimension of Europe, to stress the need for common strategies and
instruments that would combat unemployment and social
exclusion. And the result was the introduction of a new chapter on
employment. The promotion of high levels of employment is
recognised as a top-priority for the Union. There will be a
coordination of national employment policies and a mechanism of
surveillance will be established. An Employment Committee will
be created and an Employment Pact is currently being elaborated,
as a counterbalance to the Maastricht EMU provisions”. (Greek
Parliament, Session protocol 10/2/1999)
In the same session the Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Papandreou said that
“Regarding the open issue of the accountability of the Central
Bank, we as socialists claim that the ECB cannot operate in a
political vacuum. There should be democratic control. During the
negotiating of the Stability Pact, we gave a battle, in order to
ensure that the ECOFIN would have a political control over the
ECB.  The relevant provisions of the Stability Pact are not ideal,
but a step was made towards the right direction…”. (Greek
Parliament, Session protocol 10/2/1999)
The left-wing opposition remained however even after Amsterdam pessimistic
as far as the democratic and social aspects of EMU are concerned (ibid).
In an earlier article, L. Tsoukalis, professor of the Athens University and former
counsellor of PM A. Papandreou in the late 80s, pointed to the double transfer of
power implied by this innovation: from the national to the European level and
from politicians to technocrats, thus going even beyond the precedent set by the
Bundesbank, if the weakness of the European political system, which in turn
means weak political accountability of the ECB is properly considered. Here lie
some fundamental political questions.
 “How much economic policy should remain in the hands of
elected representatives? This question is, of course, not confined to
the EU level. And can there be a central bank without a
corresponding political authority? This is, indeed, a question
specific to the EU.
At the European level, what is at stake is about who and how will
determine the macroeconomics priorities for the EU as a whole,
assuming, of course, that there is still a function to perform for
elected representatives. And there is as yet no mechanism for this.
The EU budget is very small and with no provision for a
stabilisation function. On the other hand, the present system of
policy coordination cannot be expected to deliver the goods. The
broad guidelines adopted by ECOFIN every year are likely to
remain too broad to have any real effect on national economic
policies. This means that the future European economic system
will tend to be "under-stabilised" against both common and
asymmetric shocks” (L. Tsoukalis: The European Agenda: Issues
of globalisation, equity and legitimacy, The Robert Schuman
Centre, Jean Monnet Chair Papers, 98\ 49, April 1998).
Leaving the economic consequences of EMU construction aside, there is a
legitimacy deficit of the EU. It is much wider than limited powers of the
European Parliament, particularly in monetary matters, indicate. Tsoukalis asks
“Can we have democracy without a demos? and is it mainly a
question of time for a shared European identity to develop? These
are big questions generally left out of official documents, but
which naturally attract much more attention from academics “
(Ibid).
For Greece, a country currently “out” but preparing to enter EMU, institutional
innovations in the domestic front are of equal importance as the establishment of
the ECB independence. Recently, and under the pressure of the envisaged entry
in Euroland and the relevant Maastricht provisions, Greek authorities have also
institutionalised the independence of the Bank of Greece. Past experience has
greatly helped to take this decision. Indeed, as Professor Nikos Apergis
demonstrated, there is a strong correlation between inflation rates in Greece and
the degree of independence of the Central Bank during the period 1975 (in
Union of Greek Banks:  Bulletin, Athens No 18\1999, p. 39-41).
Deriving from earlier research (Mourmouras and Su, 1995) Apergis also reasons
that the role of an independent Central Bank is very significant in countries (like
Greece) where the prospect of the Economic and Monetary Union underlines the
importance that the Maastricht criteria are being met. The central bank as an
independent institution, can neutralise attempts to finance deficits.
According to L. Papademos, too, Central Bank independence enhances the
effectiveness of monetary policy. The independence of the Bank of Greece has
been defined along the lines followed in the case of the ECB (Papademos,
1997).
1.3.4  Policy co-ordination vs. centralisation
It is broadly accepted that EMU demands a closer and more effective
coordination of national fiscal policies.  In political and academic circles in
Greece the whole process of monetary integration and economic policy
coordination is expected or hoped to lead to a bigger EU budget with a
stabilisation and redistribution function.
1.4  Reactions to current events
1.4.1  Decision of the ECB to lower interest rates (April 1999)
Early in 1999, the economic situation had given rise to concern about downward
risks and had led to a precautionary interest rate reduction by 50 basis points on
8 April 1999. The downgrading of the official EU growth forecasts for 1999
from 3,6 to 2,6 per cent seemed to confirm the slowing down of economic
performance in Europe.
The decision of the ECB to lower the European interest rates, on the 8th of April
1999, generated positive reactions in the Greek Press. The majority of the
analysts shared the view that the lowering of the interest would create a climate
of optimism in the European markets, by fuelling hopes for an acceleration of
the rate of growth in the EU. (KATHIMERINI: 8/4/1999, TO VIMA: 9/4/1999,
KATHIMERINI: 9/4/1999)
According to the relevant articles, the decision of the ECB to cut the European
interest rates by 0,5 percentage points, fixing them at 2,50 %, took markets and
analysts by surprise, as the latter expected a more modest reduction of 0,25%.
(KATHIMERINI: 8/4/1999).
The Greek Ministry of Finance anticipated that the lowering of the European
interest rates would have as a result a slight increase in the average rate of
inflation in the EU, due to a reflation of the European economy, a development
that would favour the effort of the Greek authorities to reach the Maastricht
inflation criterion.2 A growing demand for Greek state-bonds was also likely to
occur. (TO VIMA: 9/41999).
According to the Governor of the Greek Central Bank Loukas
Papademos, apart from the effects produced on the international markets,
                                                          
2 In this point it is interesting to remark that ECB’s decision of November 4, 1999, to
raise interest rates by 0,5 %, setting them again at 3 %, was also greeted favourably by the
Greek Press. This recent move is expected to facilitate the course of the Greek economy
towards economic convergence and more in particular the alignment of Greek interest rates
with those in the euro area, in the run-up to EMU. (KATHIMERINI 5/11/99)
the move of the ECB was not expected to have a significant impact on the
Greek economy. Although the decision was justified by the conditions in
the European markets, it has little to do with the Greek monetary policy
stance, whose primary aim is to secure a low inflation performance, stated
Papademos. (KATHIMERINI: 9/4/1999).
Of some interest is an earlier warning of the spokesman of the Alliance of the
Left that the interest rate policy of the ECB cannot offset basic deficiencies of
the EMU construction.
“Europe lacks of a mechanism that would guarantee the equal
distribution and diffusion of the positive effects between countries
and social groups…. There are no policies that can ensure that the
widely-anticipated lowering of the European interest rate will
eventually lead to an increase of investment and employment in
Europe”.(Greek Parliament, Session protocol 10/2/1999).
1.4.2  Decision of the ECB to raise interest rates (Nov. 1999)
On Thursday, 4 November 99 the ECB announced an increase of the EU interest
rates reversing thus its expansive stance from April 1999. The increase was
intended to counter the upward trend of the balance of risks to price stability.
The Bank was also convinced that the interest rate increase would not affect
growth prospects since the economic environment was considered to be
favourable. The Bank was convinced that there was an ongoing strengthening in
the Euro area. The outlook for the world economy remains positive; this mainly
relates to the sustained growth of the EU economy, but also to the apparent
strengthening of the recoveries in South-East Asia and Japan.
Therefore the increase in interest rates would not endanger the resumption of
economic growth in the Euro-area. The Bank wanted now to contain inflationary
expectations in a forward-looking manner (which is decisive for ensuring
sustainable growth in GDP and employment). It also recommended to member
states to make convincing progress in the structural reform of the labour and
product markets, which, over the medium term, would enhance the Euro area’s
production potential and thereby curb upward pressure on process as the
recovery proceeds. Together with fiscal consolidation in the context of the
Stability and Growth Pact and the necessary moderate wage developments, such
reforms could make a crucial contribution towards transforming the current
cyclical upswing into a process of longer-term non-inflationary growth
(European Central Bank: Introductory statement to the Press Conference,
Thursday, 4 November 1999).
A few weeks later the President of the ECB repeated recommendations to
member states to accelerate their reform pace. Greek political reactions were as
mixed as they were in other member states. Government officials insisted off-
the-record that reform issues lied outside the responsibilities of the ECB and that
there was an ongoing process  of opinion exchange on such matters in the
framework of Ecofin Council (Kathimerini, several issues in Dec. 1999).
1.4.3  Reactions to the resignation to the German Minister of the Economy
In March 1999 Oscar Lafontaine resigned as Germany´s finance  minister. One
immediate effect was the rise of the Euro !  Lafontaine represented a neo-
Keynesian economic policy stance . He had tried to boost demand in order to cut
unemployment,  proposed  to reform the tax system, by reducing income taxes
for low-income earners, while taxing wealthier payers. He did not accept the
conventional, mainstream view, that unemployment is fundamentally a
structural problem, demanding deregulation of labour markets etc. He  called for
EU-wide tax harmonization, arguing that moves towards a single tax regime
must follow the single currency and that fiscal distortions were inconsistent with
an efficient operation of the single market.  He also demanded  loudly a
reorientation of the ECB monetary policy towards lower interest rates thus
generating a conflict with the ECB. The latter, preoccupied with the creation of
its reputation  as a stronghold of monetary stability, did not like to risk being
accused that it  caved in to political pressures. The priority of “politics” was
however  Lafontaine´s option.
In Greece Lafontaine´s keynesianism received much sympathy in  left wing
circles of the ruling socialists and by most of the press commentators. The book
co-authored by O. Lafontaine and Christa Mueller ( Don´t worry about
globalization-prosperity and work for all)   has been quickly translated in Greek
( Polis editions,1998) and  found a strong echo. Lafontaine´s reflections about
his political and ideological problems within the socialdemocratic government
has also been promptly translated  and almost enthusiastically received in the
press(1999). The Greek left understood Lafontaine´s resignation as the last
worring indication that “politics” were loosing ground to the market forces and
to the international finance. The Government, despite some undertones that an
expansive, EU-wide macroeconomic policy might have easied austerity,
abstained from commenting Lafontaine´s resignation.
1.4.4  The Holzman case and the Euro weakness (November 1999)
In November 1999 the German government (indeed PM Gerhard Schroeder
personally) intervened to form together with the German banks a rescue package
for the ailing big construction firm Holzman AG. The decision has been heavily
criticised inside and outside Germany (see FAZ, 26 November 1999) inter alia
because it coincided  with the fall of Euro against the Dollar towards a 1:1
parity. Some considered both, state intervention in Germany and Euro weakness,
to be interrelated phenomena. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (3
December 1999) the President of the ECB accused the German Government of
undermining through such interventions the credibility of the Euro. Most
economic commentators in the media and many economists share this view.
Gustav Horn, an economist of the DIW (Deutsches Institut fuer
Wirtschaftsforschung) objected that the ECB-President  himself gave to the Euro
a blow with his public remarks.
Greek commentators registered with sympathy Schroeder´s rescue exercises as
well as his arguments in favour of state intervention in cases that the market fails
to cope with political desiderata. In the Greek Press commentators insist that the
weakness of Euro is caused by factors other than the occasional socially-
motivated interventions, even if the latter may occur in big countries. They seem
to explain reactions against interventions of the kind decided in Germany as an
ideologically-motivated effort to restate the advantages of „anglosaxon
capitalism“ characterised by over-liberalisation of markets ( see among many
other sources reports and comments in the newspapers Eleftherotypia,
6.12.1999, Avgi, 28.11.1999).
2. Legal Framework
2.1  New Central Bank (Bank of Greece) legislation and preparations related
to the introduction of the Euro
Institutional and administrative preparations relating to the introduction of the
Euro were somehow delayed because of the late entry of the drachma to the
Eurozone.
2.1.1  Technical preparations, legislative acts and implications
Council Regulation 974/98 concerning the introduction of the Euro, is not
applicable to Member States benefiting of a derogation. Such being the case of
Greece, the country is not bound legally by the single monetary and exchange
rate policy, nor by the main acts and decisions of the ECB in this respect. Things
are different with Council regulation 1103/97 which also covers Greece:
consequently all obligations in the currency of a Member State which is since
1/1/99 participating in the Eurozone have been converted since that date into
Euro: the rule of article 3 of Regulation 1103/97 enshrining the principle of
contract continuity is of application (Obligations contracted  in other currencies
are not affected).
Tracking national rules which have to do with the Euro gives few results. The
majority of such rules fixes in Euro sums until now denominated in drachma
(e.g. Law 703/1977 on competition, as modified by Law 2741/1999, or Bank of
Greece’s Governor’s Decision 2379/96). See also Ministerial Decision 201/96
fixing the programme to issue Eurobonds, or Law 2441/96 fixing the prices for
the design of Euro coins. Thus, specific legislative rules involving the Euro up
to date have concerned technical issues and not fundamental legal aspects of the
introduction of the Euro.
Efforts to modernise the Bank  of Greece and streamline operations by
introducing institutional, organisational and technical reforms in view of the
Bank’s future integration into the European System of Central Banks were
carried out since 1996. Certain procedures, methods and working conditions
were overhauled. Necessary changes were brought about in the organisational
structure of several departments. In particular, the deregulation of domestic
markets, the conduct of exchange rate policy in an environment of free capital
movements, as well as the need to speed up the preparatory work which is
required of central banks for the operation  of the European System of Central
Banks, necessitated adjusting the organisational structure and function of the
Foreign Exchange Department to those of the respective departments of the
other European Union central banks. The design of the Hellenic Real-time
Money transfer Express System (HERMES) has been completed. A specialized
section monitors, coordinates, controls and carries out operations related to the
function of HERMES, settles matters arising between member credit institutions
and monitors cross-border payments (TARGET). Moreover, with a view to
contributing effectively to the changeover to the single European currency, the
Bank has decided to create a new unit, which in cooperation with the Hellenic
Banks’ Association,  coordinates and promotes preparatory work and supplies
the necessary information to the financial community and the public at large.
In the context of renewing mechanical installations at the Bank’s Printing
Works, the Bank acquired a new intaglio printing press and auxiliary equipment,
which became operative in early 1997. This machinery is capable of printing not
only drachma-denominated banknotes but also the future Euro notes. Also, for
the needs of the Cash Sorting and Counting centres which are soon to be
established, the Bank purchased six state-of-the-art machines which sort, count
and verify the authenticity of banknotes.
In the area of information technology (IT), a Strategic Plan was finalised and has
been implemented. An IT Centre is in place since 1997 and provides  the Bank
with the necessary infrastructure, ensuring the smooth operation of fund
transfers and minimising settlement risks in both domestic and cross – border
transactions. Local networks were installed in various units, seven workstations
connected with Internet were created, several operations were computerised and
the Bank was linked to “Interbanking Systems (DIAS) S.A. “ for the safe and
prompt transmission of netting entries by credit institutions (Bank of Greece:
Annual reports, various issues since 1996).
2.1.2  Issues and expected legal problems from the introduction of the Euro
Public discussion about the issues raised by and potential problems expected
from the introduction of the Euro has mainly been centered around the chances
of Greece meeting the Maastricht criteria and joining EMU on-schedule and, at
a lesser level of intensity, around the desirability of such joining, as already
stated in this report.
Specifically legal issues have been discussed mainly in technical debate in legal
journals and a handful of seminars: the year 2000 is expected to be more
discussion-intensive. An overview:
• Secondary Community Legislation does not rule on the full implications of
monetary change on existing contracts, although the principle of continuity in
contracts is enshrined for reasons of legal certainty and transparence. The
real issue is whether this will end up in strengthening the pacta sunt servanda
rule of art.361 of the Civil Code or the monetary equivalence rule.
• A further issue results from the degree of responsibility of banks, insurance
companies etc. to inform their customers of future changes when they are not
in a position to predict themselves final decisions. An example which has
proved quite interesting in practice in that respect is the matter of the
conversion rate of the drachma into Euro. The central rate fixed at 353, 1
dra/Euro in March 1997 looks likely to change to 340-343 dra/Euro in early
2000.
• While rules to convert shares, bonds  and other values in Euro are being
prepared, changeover responsibility and specifics remain in a gray area.
• Whenever fixed interest rates have been agreed upon for time-spans
stretching into the period of Euro, the interest rates of the drachma after
convergence to ECB rates will radically alter the balance between creditors
and debtors. Further to agreed renegotiation, or to agreeing changeover
clauses before hand, contested cases will have to be treated (having recourse
to good faith in contract or to the rebus sic stantibus clause, art. 200-288 and
eventually 388 of the Civil Code) under an uncertain body of precedent.
• Insofar as fluctuating interest rates are agreed, with reference to Libor, Fibor,
Pibor or one of the other interbank offered rates, such clauses are already
void of sense since 1.1.99 when referring to currencies merged into the Euro;
since then reference is to be made to rates derived from ECB decisions. Pre-
existing contractual clauses will have to be interpreted having recourse to the
rules of good faith in contract of articles 200, 288 of the Civil Code. Good
business practice, which is also mandated as a basis for interpretation by the
Code is of less usefulness, since no sufficient time will have elapsed for such
practice to emerge.
2.1.3  The new institutional framework providing for the independence of the
Bank of Greece
The Bank of Greece acquired new statutes by law in 1998 (Law 2609\1998).
The new Statutes provide for the personal, financial and operational
independence of the BoG in accordance with the rules decided in Maastricht
(Treaty on the EU). According to the law “ the primary objective of the Bank of
Greece shall be to ensure price stability. Without prejudice to this primary
objective, the Bank shall support the general economic policy of the
government” (Article 4 para. 1 of the Law 2609\1998).
Furthermore“ When carrying out the tasks conferred upon them, neither the
Bank of Greece nor any member of its decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from the government or any organization” (Article 5A Law
2609\1998).
The newly established Monetary Policy Council  plays a central role in the new
framework. It comprises the Governor of the Bank of Greece, the two Deputy
Governors and three other members. The members of the Committee  are
“appointed from among persons of  recognised standing and professional
experience in monetary and banking matters” (Article 35A Law 2609\1998).
Interest rate decisions throughout the crucial year 1999, when bringing along
inflation rate convergence with “price stability” as determined by the ECB and
the inflation criterion of Maastricht gave rise to acrimonious public debate, but
in fact demonstrated that Central Bank independence was a reality in the run-up
to EMU.
On January 1, 1999 the BoG became a member of the European System of
Central Banks and its Governor a member of the General Council of the ECB.
2.1.4  The National Transition Plan to the Euro
The Administration is involved to the introduction of the Euro in several
respects: as of its responsibility to incorporate Community Law to the national
legal order, as of it competence to determine economic, social etc. policies and
as of its task to fix the regulatory framework applicable to the private sector.
Consequently a National Transition Plan (NTP) has been formulated, following
general directives from and under the guidance of a Committee of
Representatives of the Social Partners, of the Bank of Greece, the Universities
and all public administrations involved. The NTP closely follows the time-
schedule fixed by the Madrid Summit for the introduction with the Euro, along
with the political time-schedule for the accession of Greece to the third phase of
EMU. The NTP has been notified to E.C. services so as to ameliorate the
common preparation of Greece’s participation.
Preparations for the introduction of the Euro have been quite extensive at a
Ministry of Finance level, with groups formed to address:
• The legislative acts  needed to rule conversion rates, the rounding-up of
prices etc.
• The preparation of the Ministry services, mainly tax authorities, to deal with
the public in matters relating to the Euro
• The adaptation of companies’ record-keeping
• The filing of tax returns and the assessment of tax
• The payment of tax, duties and other sums due
• The drafting of the State Budget and all associated documents in Euro: a first
partial run of the system was attempted with the 2000 Budget.
• The issuance and convergence of State and public-sector securities
• The adaptation of computer infrastructure and software, along with the
preparation for the Y2K shock: since digitalisation and networking has been
rather low in Greek public administrations, this aspect was largely faced from
1997 onwards along with the original introduction of computer-based
routines throughout the administration.
A public information campaign has been planned for some time, in coordination
with the campaigns already prepared and implemented by the European
Commission and the ECB at a Europe-wide level, but is still not running.
3. Trends Towards Spill Over
3.1  Spill over: Perceptions on the implications of Euro for other than
macroeconomic policy areas
In the following, two kinds of spill over are been considered one at the level of
European policy and the other in the domestic context. For example, spill over at
the European level is taking place whenever EU-regulation is initiated to protect
Europe’s single market. Such is the case with tax harmonisation. Spill over at
national level is associated with the structural adjustments functionally
necessitated (but not formally required) by the EMU.
3.1.1  Introduction: The need for reforms recognised
It is broadly accepted that EMU has wide implications in policy areas that
remain in the responsibility of national governments and have not been directly
addressed by the Maastricht Treaty such as labour markets policy, state
intervention in the productive sector and social policy. Still, EMU and the EU as
whole have acted as a powerful catalyst for domestic reform in all member
countries. The debate at EU level is running under the heading “conditions for
the success of EMU”. In Greece the Bank of Greece resumes the debate on
structural adjustment inter alia on the occasion of its Annual Report (see Bank
of Greece: Annual Report of the Governor 1998, Athens, April 1999 and earlier
issues).  The state budget documents and in particular its introductory volume,
published early in November, contain the reform conception for the next year
and an overall assessment of the progress made in the past in adjusting
institutions and regulations to the new environment.
Greek officials have recognised, in philosophical as well as practical terms, that
EMU has a significant impact upon several policy areas. Nicholas Garganas, deputy
governor of the Bank of Greece, argues along the lines followed by the Council and
the Commission as reflected in the annual exercise of the “ Guidelines” that
Greece, apart from stabilisation, is faced with the additional challenges of stepping-
up the structural reforms required to prepare the economy for the demanding
competitive environment of monetary union.
In an Address on “ Integrating Greece into the Euro Area: The challenges
ahead” (at the “Athens Summit 1999”, 18 September 1999), Garganas saw
structural adjustment as closely interrelated with the need of coping with shocks.
To him the incidence of asymmetric/country-specific disturbances will diminish
after entry into the Euroland, but this does not mean that such shocks will
disappear altogether. Therefore, in adverse circumstances in which a change in
the exchange rate or national monetary policy would have been helpful,
alternative adjustment mechanisms will have to be provided for so as to respond
to macroeconomic disturbances once national authorities have lost monetary and
exchange rate independence. He assesses that structural reforms represent part
of the solution.
“On the structural front, there has been much progress in several
areas over recent years, and it is beginning to yield substantial
benefits to the economy. But, given the breadth and the magnitude
of the structural problems, much still remains to be done.
In particular, more stress needs to be placed on enhancing
competition in product markets and improving labour market
flexibility. Greater market flexibility will not only allow Greece to
cope with country-specific disturbances more easily, but it will
also, be reinforcing Greece’s competitiveness, ensure a tension-
free macroeconomic growth process and increase the employment
– content of growth.
……The government’s privatisation and flotation programme has
been steadily implemented. This has contributed significantly to
debt reduction and enhanced competition in the banking system.
But, privatisation needs to expand into other areas, including key
economic sectors that remain dominated by public enterprises.
Tax reform is also needed to alleviate the tax burden, particularly,
although not only, on wage earness, and bring the tax structure into
line with that in the euro area, thereby preventing the movement of
capital and labour to lower-taxed areas.
A final important area of structural reform concerns the public
administration. Here again, though significant steps have been
made, much remains to be dome to provide the country with a
truly modern, efficient and flexible state apparatus”. (N. Garganas,
1999).
This is indeed an ambitious reform plan.
Structural reforms enjoy the support of the Union of Greek Industrialists (SEB).
As the president of the SEB I. Stratos has stressed in many occasions,
“sustainable” monetary stability is not thinkable without deep structural
adjustments. He would also have preferred a convergence strategy based upon
tax and state expenditure reductions instead of the one currently implemented,
which relies heavily on tax increases.  He is convinced that the problems of
fiscal discipline will become acute and even greater  after EMU-entry (see
Stratos´ statement in the Kathimerini, 16.9.1999 and one of his many articles,
e.g. the one published in Oikonomikos Tachydromos, 18.2.1999).
How far and fast should structural adjustment go?  This question has been raised
time and again raised inside the governing party and throws a heavy shadow
over the reform policy.  The Greek Socialists or at least part of them try to locate
a “middle way” between the demands of European integration (and, in fact,
globalisation) and the traditional principles of social democracy. Thus far they
are on the same track with other socialist partners in Europe. Their concerns
have been recently debated during the Congress of the Socialist International
(October 1999):
On the Greek side PM K. Simitis made several warnings against an
“uncontrolled liberalisation” and insisted in defending the social face of
governmental policies. The following citations contain the core arguments of his
intervention:
“The “casino capitalism”, which has been striving to replace, and
in some respects has indeed replaced, the mixed market economy,
has already led to social dislocation, poverty, social deprivation,
marginalization, political fragmentation, violence and breakdown.
Globalisation is eroding the cohesion and viability of the state and
the capacity of governments to deal effectively with an increasing
array of economic, social and political problems in some parts of
the world while it is increasing the range of opportunities, the
margins of power, influence and wealth in others.
Unregulated market capitalism is proving economically wasteful
and social destructive. It erodes mutual loyalty, trust and social
bonds upon which free, democratic, solidarity –based societies
have been constructed and depend for their survival. It saps the
bases of social cohesion and the sources of social solidarity. It
gives rise to unacceptably high levels of unemployment and social
exclusion.
Faced with these new realities, challenges and risks, we have no
other option but to radically readjust our objectives, activity,
strategies and methods of action while keeping our fundamental
principles, values and philosophy – the values of democracy,
solidarity, social justice, equality and progress”.
He added that the socialists should re-examine
“The significance of interregional cooperation and European
integration as alternative, democratic formations to
globalisation….. In the context of Europe, this means that we must
be able to dominate the intellectual discussion worldwide. For
much too long the intellectual debate has been dominated by neo-
liberal thinking. It is high time to recapture the intellectual ground.
….The role of the state remains exceptionally important in this
new environment but it differs from the past. It is the role of a
“headquarters –state”, preserving market competition, reinforcing
innovation and research, investing in human resources, guarding
over the interests of workers and rights of the citizens, caring for
the unemployed and the forthcoming generations. It is a “state-
regulator”, a “social investment state” not a “state-producer” in the
economic domain”.
However, he added
“The main source of wealth and the competitive advantage of
every country is today its manpower. The new economy is based
on specialisation, flexibility, and adaptability”.(Contribution by
PM K. Simitis at the Congress of the Socialist International on “
Socialism in the Twenty-first century: The need for a new political
agenda”, Paris, October 20, 1999).
Despite elaborate coding, we discern a contradiction between current policies
implying adjustment to the given framework of EMU (and globalisation) and the
ideological questioning of precisely this framework.
The Opposition has not missed the point. George Alogoskoufis, one of the most
prominent Greek economists and a candidate for a ministerial job (probably as
Minister for National Economy if the main Opposition party, New Democracy,
wins the next elections) accuses the government of using unreliable figures and
of delaying crucial reforms needed to make nominal convergence “sustainable”.
According to him, the government has not taken enough steps to liberalise and
deregulate the economy and it drives a rather hesitant privatisation course. As
Alogoskoufis and other ND spokesmen say the government has often declined
to cope successfully with populist resistance (see interviews of G. Alogoskoufis
in daily newspapers, f.e. Kathimerini, 19.9.1999 and in the magazine Epikentra
(edited by the Centre of Political Education), September 1999).
New Democracy has long ago adopted a more liberal stance over reform issues.
The party favours bolder and occasionally unpopular measures to resolve long-
term structural problems of the country in several sectors (pensions, public
health, education, labour markets). Privatisation stays high on the Opposition
agenda and the industry’s agenda, too (see Doukas, P.: The area of Euro and
Greece, Sideris: Athens 1999. See also A. Kanelopoulos’s Address at the annual
conference of the SEB, in SEB Bulletin, No 584, June-July 1999).
3.1.2  Privatisation
The search for ideological compromise cannot conceal the drastic reorientation
of public policy in Greece away from traditional socialist and, indeed,
conservative concepts  favouring state intervention and state enterprises towards
a more liberal stance.  In recognition of the large drag on the economy, as well
as the burden on the budget, the Government has embarked on a programme to
privatise and \ or revitalise public enterprises. Research supports the new trend.
Prominent among several contributions is the work made in the framework of
the OECD in close cooperation with the Ministry of National Economy.
A recent publication (Mylonas1\Isabelle Joumard: Greek public enterprises:
Challenges for reform, OECD economics department working paper No 214,
Paris May 1999) summarises the results of the OECD research as follows:
In outlining public sector performance in the past the authors of the report assert
that “for at least two decades, almost all public enterprises have been poorly
managed and have often been used as vehicles for implementing broader policy
objectives unrelated to their primary objective of providing goods and services.
As a result, their operations are often inefficient, the quality of service generally
unsatisfactory with repercussions on other sectors, and they are an extensive
drain on the public purse. This negative assessment is generally acknowledged,
including by the Government and social partners”(ibid).
Reform of public enterprises has gained prominence as a policy priority from
1996. An impetus to reform is the desire to meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria,
and this objective would be facilitated by a significant reduction of the financial
burden the public enterprises impose on the budget. Looking further ahead, EU
membership necessitates an opening to competition and a levelling of the
playing field in most of the markets in which public enterprises currently operate
as monopolies. The survival of public enterprises, therefore, hinges on deep
restructuring.
The Greek public enterprise sector comprises nearly 50 large enterprises and
employs about 130 000 individuals, equivalent to about 3 ½ per cent of total
employment but, due to the large number of self-employed in Greece, 6 per cent
wage-earners. This sector is dominated by about 10 firms, which include the
largest enterprises in Greece and those that are usually monopolists (in a few
cases oligopolists) in sectors which provide critical inputs to the economy, such
as communications (telephony and mail), energy (electricity, lignite mining,
petroleum, and natural gas), and transportation (air, rail, and urban transport).
The poor financial performance by public enterprises has required financial
assistance from the central government, equivalent to nearly half of Greece’s
large debt burden (with the latter amounting to nearly 110 per cent of GDP at
end-1997).
Mylonas and Joumard estimated that a public enterprise reform could result in a
cumulative increase in total output (direct and secondary) of the order of 5-7 per
cent of GDP (ibid).
3.1.3  Tax Harmonisation
Tax harmonisation falls into the chapter of spill over from one policy sector to
another at the European level. The Commission has long ago set up an Agenda
comprising removing distortions in indirect taxes, ending preferential tax
treatment of foreign companies and stamping out tax evasion.
The tax treatment of savings in the form of a compulsory EU-wide withholding
tax seems to be the most contentious proposal. Member states have failed to
agree up to now. Greece has supported Britain’s and Luxembourg’s blocking the
withholding tax. However, the government makes recently second thoughts,
taking into account that present arrangements mean that each country plays the
role of a tax haven  to residents of others.
Academic thinking favours savings tax, too. According to Professors K.
Stefanou and I. Nikolakopoulou-Stefanou,
 “because of the competition between the different national tax
systems, in those countries that the taxation on savings is very
high, the relative earnings are very low since the capital is attracted
by markets with the lower taxation. As a result from this
competition, these countries are forced to decrease their taxes. The
efforts to harmonise the taxation systems have only been partially
effective.  Consequently, governments are under the obligation to
transfer the taxation burdens from capital to labour or to shrink
social expenditures, thus requiring sacrifices from the
employees“(see Stephanou, K.\Nikolakopoulou I: „European
Integration and the Social State” in  Greek Bank Union: Bulletin,
no  17\  1999, p. 105).
Greece has recently introduced taxation on savings and seems now rather
prepared to accept tax harmonisation in the EU. If not EU-wide harmonised,
savings taxation may distort investment decisions and financial transactions.
3.1.4  Community Social Policy: The view of the Trade Unions
On the domestic front there is also increasing understanding of the need for
pensions reform; but the system is so riddled with distortions that its reform is as
difficult as it is necessary. The commissioning of an in-depth actuarial study at
the highest level of international expertise has been initiated, following the effort
being made to consolidate the hundreds of pension funds presently in the state
system. A combination of patience and firmness should yield results, as it has
done in other areas of the economy. But a quick transformation should be
neither expected nor demanded. John Spraos, 20 Oct. 1999
Greece, like other EU Member States, will face increased pension liabilities in
the second decade of the next century as a large number of people retire because
of a marked ageing of the population. As a result, public pension spending is
likely to increase sharply in relation to GDP, particularly if there is no reform of
the social security system. Therefore, a “ speedy” reduction in public debt is
essential. (so thinks Garganas).
The government could also press ahead as fast as possible with the reform of the
social security system (for example, along the lines implied by the Spraos
Committee Report of 1997).
3.1.5  Labour Market Policy
Greek trade Unions have in the past repeatedly denounced what they perceive as
a bias of the EMU against labour. In a recent article the president of the General
Confederation of Greek Trade Unions(G.S.E.E.) Mr Polizogopoulos, argues that
“the single currency is connected with low wages for a
considerable number of employees, stagnating or reduced welfare
expenditures and downgrading of existing welfare
systems……income inequalities have been expanded as well as the
differences in living conditions and safety standards in workplace
conditions during work”  ( Ekfrasi, Athens, May 1999, p.27)
Concerning unemployment, Mr Polizogopoulos demands both a new policy mix
comprising an expansive macroeconomic policy stance and specific measures,
for example reductions of weekly working time, to expand employment under
EMU.  Last but not least European policy should in his words cease to
“discriminate” against social protection, and instead, help to stabilise the
European social model (ibid.)
The Unions rightly see that EMU demands increased labour market flexibility
and wage constraint. They warn however that
“adjustment through wage flexibility cannot go on for long, since
this would  mean a continuous redistribution of income
unfavourable to employees” (Institute of Labour (INE): The Greek
economy and employment, annual report, Athens 1999, p.48).
The conclusion is that in the long run,
“the position of the Greek economy can be improved only by
enhancing  labour productivity. Unequal rates of labour
productivity between the member states could, in the long run, lead
to concentration of production in some regions leaving behind
others. This reallocation of production activities would either
increase unemployment in some of the regions, or generate
emigration to the regions that have attracted investments and
production (ibid.)”.
Several contributions on the Unions side take up and expand on more theoretical
terms the same arguments. For example E. Ioakimoglou, a prominent analyst of
the Confederation (Wages, Competitiveness and Unemployment, GSEE, Institute
of Labour, Athens,  May 1999) claims critically that, after Maastricht, economic
policy priorities have shifted from full employment to price stability, debt to
GNP ratio and fiscal discipline. Employment is no more a goal of the economic
policy but a task for the relatively autonomous ‘employment policies’, which
derive from the  so-called ‘Labour economics’ The latter see a strong link
between  real wages and unemployment rates and are convinced that
unemployment is a result of low profitability which in turn is almost exclusively
attributed to high labour cost. Ioakimoglou denies that there is empirical
evidence for such arguments. The link between labour cost and competitiveness
is complex one. Countries with a high unit labour cost show high levels of
competitiveness while others with low wages have not improved their7
performance. In Greece, unit labour cost has been reduced by 20% in real terms
between 1983-98 while at the same time the country’s competitiveness
deteriorated (ibid.).  Putting it in a different way, Ioakimoglou asserts that labour
costs in Greece are comparatively low, reduction of labour costs in real terms
was not been followed by an increase of competitiveness and \ or employment,
increased profitability based upon labour cost suppression has not led to an
increase in investment nor to an increase in employment.
These are hard facts that have to be seriously considered in forming Greek (and
other) economic policy orientations.
Another view sees that employment prospects in Greece, after the country’s
participation in the Euro area, mainly depend on the content of European
economic policy. It also depends on the contribution of the Community’s budget
in the development of solidarity between member states.
In a similar way, Castoridas complains that labour market flexibility has
developed to be an overriding economic policy. From his view, this represents a
rather reductionist handling of the theory of Optimum Currency Areas leading to
steadily intensified structural reforms in the labour market and social policy,
which exert pressure on wages to keep them in line with inflation rate levels,
reduce social security, promote different remuneration regimes in the framework
of local employment pacts etc. All these measures aim at reducing labour costs
through the squeezing of social rights and are additionally assisted by the state’s
ideological mechanisms and immigration. (D. Kastoridas: “Is the European
Union an optimum currency area?” In Enimerosi-Bulletin of the Institute of
Labour, Athens April 1999).
Despite severe criticisms, however, the Unions invest some hopes in the
evolving employment strategy of the EU embodied in the National Action Plan
for Employment. (GSEE: “National Action Plan for Employment, The Union´s
proposals”, in Enimerossi-Bulletin of the Institute of Labour, April 1999). They
assess these Plans are able to create new employment opportunities, discipline
employment policy through evaluation procedures and interest-group
participation in its shaping and give rise to an active labour market policy (e.g.
educational measures to improve access to the labour market).
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1. Political Aspects
by Elena Rigacci Hay
1.1  Italian Public Opinion and the Euro
The transition from the Lira to the single European currency (the Euro) will not
only depend on the technical steps needed to introduce the latter (actual
substitution of one currency for another, coherent management of economic
policies), but also on Italian citizens’ understanding and acceptance of this new
reality which will deeply affect their old behaviour patterns.  Italians’
perceptions of the effects of the introduction of the Euro must be analysed and
taken into account for their influence on Italian government policies in related
areas.
1.1.1 Support for the single currency
Through the years, the Italians have proven to be the most supportive and
enthusiastic people in Europe with regard to the European Monetary Union
(EMU) and the introduction of the Euro.
A public opinion poll carried out in five European countries, including Italy, by the
French Agency “Promodes” in April 19993 shows that Italians are still very
supportive of the single European currency. 72% of the Italians interviewed felt
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that the Euro “will have a positive and decisive impact on their everyday life”,
while only 62% of the Belgians and 60% of the French expressed the same
opinion. An opinion poll done last year by “Ipsos-Afp”4 showed a similar
outcome.
A 1999 public opinion poll carried out by Doxa shows an increase in Italian
consent for the introduction of the Euro: 85.7% of the people interviewed
expressed a positive attitude towards it; only 7% were against its introduction5.
The “Eurobarometer” opinion poll of September 1999 also shows that Italy was
the most enthusiastic country in Europe, with 83% of the people interviewed
expressing a positive attitude towards the Euro6.
1.1.2  Level of information
The April 1999 “Promodes” opinion poll points out that Italians do not consider
themselves to be well informed about the practical consequences of the Euro. They
express concern for possible practical difficulties related to the conversion of Liras
into Euros7.
The same view is expressed in a Doxa8 opinion poll done in June 1999 on behalf
of the Italian Euro Committee. The results indicate that Italians have little basic
information about the Euro. It is encouraging to notice, however, that 93.3% of the
people interviewed are familiar with the name “Euro” and that only 1.5% of them
still confuse it with the ECU (5% do not even recall the name of Euro).
Notwithstanding these positive news, there is still considerable ignorance about the
Euro’s relative value and the countries involved in the 3rd stage of EMU.
Only 13.9% of the people interviewed know the exact value of the Euro in relation to
the Lira (1 euro=1936,27 Liras); only 15.1% of those interviewed feel that its value
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corresponds to 1936 liras, 44.5% were completely wrong and 26.2% couldn’t answer
at all. To the question “what countries other than Italy belong to the Euro-zone?”
only 23.2% answered correctly, 70.1% gave a wrong answer, and 6.7% did not
answer.  It is interesting to notice that, as a Doxa opinion poll indicated, radio and
television are the principal vehicles for information on the Euro. The quantity of
information broadcast on the European Union and the introduction of the Euro has
been enormous but, especially on the second topic, often too technical and
specialised. Although this kind of information has affected people’s perceptions of
the Euro positively, more targeted information may be necessary. The Italian
government is aware of this problem and has declared its willingness to invest in the
area of public information.
1.1.3  Price stability and currency operations
Notwithstanding their positive attitude towards the introduction of the Euro,
Italians have a wide range of concerns regarding it. Most are related to possible
price instability, loss of money in exchange operations and adjustment of their
savings (56%). Only 11% of the persons interviewed expressed their readiness to
use the single currency in current operations or to carry out their financial
operations in Euro9. The outcome of this opinion poll may be related to the
absence of targeted information, especially towards disadvantaged categories (the
elderly).
1.1.4  Effects of the Stability Pact on Economic Growth and the Labour
Market
All public opinion polls show enthusiastic Italian support for the Euro.  Italians
perceive its introduction as bringing clear advantages in terms of national currency
stability in relation to the dollar. This fact is also relevant for enterprises with
commercial relations with foreign countries in that it will improve their long-term
planning. General perceptions related to the problem of unemployment and
economic growth are positive, despite the idea that the Euro will not have any
direct or immediate positive effect. In fact, Italian institutions need time to adjust
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and reform the Italian social and economic system. Structural reforms are
especially needed since decisions related to monetary policies have been delegated
from National Central Banks (NCBs) to the European Central Bank, thereby
hampering the use of short-term national monetary policies to tackle
unemployment and economic stagnation. (These aspects are dealt with in the
following chapter).
In conclusion, the Italians’ support of the single European currency is strong, even
though they, curiously, know little about it. They generally accept the idea that
EMU will not automatically trigger better economic and social conditions, but that
it can be used as an engine to guide the implementation of structural reforms.
1.2  Italian Institutions and the Euro
1.2.1  The current debate and proposals of reform
Italy has been able to meet European targets for fiscal consolidation, while
beginning the introduction of wide-ranging reforms aimed at modernising the
public sector and the tax system. However, in the last year a number of factors -
increased competition from outside Europe, weakening demand in major EU
markets, the direct and indirect effects of the Russian crisis and the Kosovo
conflict - have combined to weaken confidence and counteract the beneficial
effects of EMU membership (lower inflation and interest rates), slowing down
economic growth.  In fact, as agreed to by all European countries in the Maastricht
Treaty, certain convergence parameters had to be reached in order to be admitted
into the third phase of EMU; one of these was that public debt had to be no more
than 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). EU countries would then need to
continue reducing their parameters in order to achieve financial consolidation.
Italy indicated to the European Commission that it would have brought its deficit
down to 2% of GDP in 1999 and to 1.5% in 2000 (it was 2.7% in 1998). But in
spring 1999, with the Italian economy slowing down, the Italian government
feared that it would not be able to comply with the forecast and announced a new
forecast to the Commission: 2.4% for 1999.
There have been polemics following the Italian government’s statement – mostly
from the opposition parties. In reality, the process of convergence had slowed
down, but was continuing successfully nevertheless: there had, in fact, been a
decrease from the 1998 value of 2.7%, and the process of convergence foreseen by
the Stability Pact had been respected. At that point, the Italian government briefly
took into consideration fiscal manoeuvring, but this option was immediately
rejected since it was felt that it would worsen the European economic situation
(increasing taxes and decreasing spending). In September 1999, the government
indicated that it was increasingly confident to be able to meet its original deficit
target for the year 1999 of 2% of GDP10. At a seminar held in Cernobbio on the
Italian economy,11 many considerations were made in relation to the “Growth and
Stability Pact” and its implications for Italy. Cesare Romiti, President of the
publishing house Rizzoli Corriere della Sera and Honorary President of FIAT,
maintained that the “EMU Growth and Stability Pact” must be renegotiated and
asked for a derogation for Italy. Fausto Bertinotti, leader of the Partito della
Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), Franco Modigliani, Nobel Prize for economics
and the Europarlamentarian, Giorgio La Malfa backed his view.
Giovanni Agnelli, Honorary President of Fiat, Piero Fassino, Italian Minister of
Commerce, Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy and
Beniamino Andreatta, former Defence Minister, did not agree with the above
view. Agnelli said that Italy has lost its price competitiveness with respect to
European partners (a decrease of 9% since 1994) and that this has had very bad
consequences for employment. He went on to say that the main cause is Italy’s
economic fragility and political instability. He also feels that there is a need for
modernisation in the field of education and research; privatisation, building of
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infrastructures and diffusion of computer technologies, not to speak of the reform
of the pension system and salaries12.
In conclusion, the proposal to make a special derogation for Italy cannot be taken
seriously into consideration: first of all because, as demonstrated earlier, there is
no need for it; second, because, from a legal point of view, the Pact can be
modified only if all member states agree. Such a proposal would only confirm the
other EMU countries’ fears that public expenditures in Italy will increase and that
Italy will be unable to comply with the targets of the Pact. The Italian economic
community and institutions are strongly in favour of reforming the Italian political
and economic system, also in order to be able to comply with the Maastricht
targets.
1.2.2  ECB Policy Measures
Concerning policy measures of the European Central Bank, the Bank of Italy has
not expressed negative criticism of the ECB’s monetary policies and feels that
ECB policies have been coherent with its main task, maintaining price stability.
On the other hand, economist Paolo Savona13 expressed concern about the
weakness of the Euro and its (at that time) 12 point fall with respect to the dollar.
He was also surprised that the business community and national banks were not
criticising the ECB. Savona felt that economic conditions in Europe were a cause
of the weakness of the Euro, but he also attributed some responsibility to the
monetary stances taken by the ECB in December 1998 and April 1999. These
policies brought down interest rates, causing stagnation in employment and
income, and a movement of capital towards the United States, with a
consequential decrease in investment opportunities.
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Franco Modigliani and Giorgio La Malfa expressed the same opinion.14 They felt
that high levels of unemployment have been worsened by the restrictive monetary
policy of the ECB, which caused devaluation and a consequent slowdown in
economic activity. The policy decisions taken in December 1998 and April 1999
had negative effects on investments, aggregate demand and the employment rate.
On 4th of November 1999 the ECB increased by half a point the interest rate. The
Italian government was supportive of the ECB measure and did not express
concern for Italian economic growth rate. Also the Italian Treasury Minister,
Giuliano Amato, expressed his support for the ECB. However, he recognised the
possibility of negative consequences for Italy, especially given the country’s high
deficit15. The President of Confindustria, Giorgio Fossa, expressed his concern,
retaining the monetary policy of ECB a new complicating factor “for a country
that has already a slow growth rate and an high deficit” 16.
It should be taken into account that ECB monetary policy, given the different
economic conditions and the still unclear modalities of transmission of their effects
in terms of timing and effectiveness to the different European countries17, cannot
be positive for all countries. ECB monetary policy decisions are related to two
pillars: the first is a reference value of 4.5% of annual money-supply (MS) growth;
the second involves a range of indicators such as wages, price indices and business
confidence. The importance of harmonisation of economic and financial situations
is obvious from what has been stated above. Economists continue to retain,
therefore, the importance of structural reforms of the Italian economic system in
order to fully benefit from positive effects of ECB monetary policies.
1.3 Institutional problems posed by the EMU
                                                          
14 Modigliani, Franco and La Malfa, Giorgio “ECB paralyzed by its own power”, in
Corriere della Sera - Corriere Economia, 21 June 1999.
15 Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 November 1999.
16 Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 November 1999.
17 The Economist, 26 June 1999, p.95.
1.3.1  Independence and accountability of the ECB
The issue of independence of the ECB is strictly related to the issue of
accountability of the ECB to the European Parliament and to national
governments.  The Treaty clearly states that neither the ECB nor National
Central Banks can accept or press for instructions from Community institutions
or organs, governments or member states.
In their book on EMU18, Francesco Papadia and Carlo Santini support the
independence of the ECB from national governments in the implementation of
monetary policy. The ECB would be more successful in maintaining a stable
purchase parity power in goods and services, in creating positive effects for the
economy and in keeping down inflation. Stability of exchange rates, they say, will
be possible only when prices and interest rates are the same for all countries in
Europe. It is implied that there is a direct relationship between the independence of
the ECB and economic growth.
One of the threats for the ECB envisaged by some is that it will become too
technical and be characterised by an absence of democratic accountability and
an aseptic nature.  These fears cannot be fully shared, since NCBs and the ECB
are not wholly unrelated entities; in fact, NCBs contribute fully to decisions
related to monetary policy since they became part of the ESCB. Common
monetary policy is not driven by national governments, but the ECB takes their
recommendations into serious account.
State Councellor Giuseppe Pasqua19 underlines that the ECB fulfils its
responsibility requirements towards the European Parliament in various ways. The
main tools are auditions of the ECB Governor before the European Parliament, as
well as the annual report about the Bank’s activities before the Parliament and the
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European Council. Andrea Manzella20, member of the Italian Senate, feels that
mechanisms of ECB accountability before national parliaments are no longer
possible after the delegation of monetary policy to the ECB, as it is controlled by
the Council and the Euro Parliament.
1.3.2  The co-ordination between National Central Banks and the ECB
The relationships between the European Central Bank and the national banks
cannot be based on the subsidiarity principle. This means that, since monetary
policy has been delegated to the ECB, only residual powers are left in the hands of
national banks. However, the ECB is linked to national banks; Italian Central Bank
Governor Antonio Fazio participates in ECB Council meetings where he has the
broader task of sustaining European interests. Furthermore numerous committees
have been brought into existence for each of the technical branches of the ECB in
which representatives of NCBs formulate their opinions (the so-called
“eurosystem”).
Natalino Ronzitti feels that, since the ECB has been given exclusive competence
in the area of monetary policy, this has irrevocably taken away the powers of
National Central Banks to decide on their state’s monetary policies. The principle
of subsidiarity can be applied only within the realm of shared competence between
the ECB and NCBs. This could be the case for prudential supervision. Giuseppe
Pasqua, State Councillor and member of the Italian Euro Committee21 is also of
this view. He feels that co-ordination between the Italian Central Bank and the
ECB is guaranteed through the participation of the governors of national banks in
the ECB Council.
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From a legal point of view, it is clear from the treaties that in addition to prudential
supervision on the credit institutions, the Bank of Italy will continue to do research
and analysis on the economic and legal system, to elaborate and collect data and
statistical information and to run the state treasury.
2. Legal Framework
by Marina Mancini
2.1. The Law as It Stands
2.1.1  Introduction
Italy took its first steps towards the European Monetary Union immediately after
the signature of the Maastricht Treaty. Legislative Decree no. 385 of 1
September 199322 and Law no. 483 of 26 November 199323 contained some
provisions aimed at making the Bank of Italy consistent with the model of an
independent national central bank, as outlined by the EC Treaty24, and at
implementing Article 101 (ex Article 104) and Article 102 (ex Article 104A) of
that Treaty25.
The above mentioned legislative acts tackled the problem of giving the Bank of
Italy the power to decide on the guidelines of monetary policy without
interference from the Government26. In particular, Law no. 483 of 26 November
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Italy started to intensify its efforts to pass  to the third stage of Monetary Union
in 1996. The Decree of the Prime Minister of 27 June 199627 entrusted the
Ministry of the Treasury with the task of co-ordinating all the activities
concerning the introduction of the euro in the Italian economic and legal system
and, to this end, provided for the establishment of an ad hoc committee, the so-
called Euro Committee, as a special body of the Ministry of the Treasury. The
Euro Committee was subsequently established by the Decree of the Minister of
the Treasury of  12 September 1996.
The Euro Committee is divided into three sub-committees, in charge with the
task of suggesting measures concerning the introduction of the single currency
in the sectors of financial institutions, public administration and companies,
respectively 28.
In view of the need to involve all the branches of the public administration, at
both central and local levels, in the process of preparing for the introduction of
the single currency, the Decree of  the Prime Minister of 3 June 199729 obliged
all public administrations to elaborate plans for adjustment to the euro and to
submit them to the Euro Committee within three months from its publication.
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The plans should indicate the changes in regulations, organization, electronic
devices and personnel training requested by the adoption of the euro.
Moreover, the Decree of the Prime Minister of 3 June 1997 provided for the
establishment of Provincial Committees for the Euro, the so-called Provincial
Euro Committees, as local branches of the Euro Committee, charged with the
task of disseminating information on the process of preparing for the single
currency, verifying fulfillment of the obligations concerning adjustment by local
administrations and dealing with the problems they might meet. The Provincial
Euro Committees were subsequently established by the Decree of the Minister
of the Treasury of 6 August 199730.
2.1.2  Law no. 433 of  17 December 1997
The first legislative act specifically concerning the transition from the
Italian currency to the euro is Law no. 433 of 17 December 199731. With this
law, Parliament delegated the Government to issue the legislative decrees
needed to give full effect to the EC provisions on transition to the third stage of
the Monetary Union and to ensure the compatibility of national law, on the one
hand, with the EC Treaty and ESCB Statute, on the other hand  (Article 1 par.
1). The delegation was thought to be necessary because of the specificity of the
subject and the difficulty in coordination.
When enacting legislative decrees, the Government should follow the general
principles and criteria set down by the Parliament in the delegating act:
continuity of legal instruments and legal relations; neutrality of the transition to
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31 Published in Official Gazette no. 295 of 19 December 1997. For a comment on this
law, see RONFINI F., op. cit., p. 43 et seq. References to the Italian legislation concerning the
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M. / VERDAM  A. F., Introduction of the Euro in the Various Member States. An Inventory of
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255 et seq..
the single currency; full information on transition rules; gradual transition to the
single currency (Article 2).
With respect to particular issues, the Government should conform to specific
principles and criteria. For instance, the index-linking parameters, which ceased
to exist following the introduction of the euro and could not be automatically
replaced, should be fixed again, thereby ensuring continuity and economic-
financial equivalence between the old and the new ones (Article 4).
Law no. 433 of 17 December 1997 also provided that the Government could
issue new legislative decrees modifying the ones previously passed within two
years from its entry into force, always in conformity with the principles and
criteria indicated in it (Article 1 par. 4).
Finally, Law no. 433 of 17 December 1997 re-named the Euro Committee
“Committee for Directing and Coordinating the Implementation of  the Euro”
and specified that it shall continue to operate for no longer than six months after
the Italian lira ceases to have the status of legal tender (Article 14 par. 1).
2.1.3  Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998
Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 199832 was the first act enacted by the
Government in execution of the delegating act by the Parliament (Law no. 433
of 17 December 1997). First of all, this decree stated that the Bank of  Italy is an
integral part of the European System of Central Banks and that it acts in
conformity with the instructions of the European Central Bank (Article 2 par. 1).
It also established that the Bank of Italy is obliged to manage the official foreign
exchange reserves in accordance with the provisions of the ESCB Statute and
the ECB Statute (Article 7 par. 2)33.
                                                          
32 Published in Official Gazette no. 61 of 14 March 1998.
33 Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998 left it up to a subsequent decree of the
Minister of the Treasury to fix the date of entry into force of  Article 2 and Article 7 par. 2
(Article 11 par. 1).
Moreover, Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998 regulated the transfer of
certain powers from the Bank of  Italy to the European Central Bank. It stated
that the interest rate on interest-bearing current account deposits at the Bank of
Italy should be fixed by the Governor of the Bank until the date of adoption of
the single currency by Italy. After that date, the power to fix that interest rate
must be exercised in conformity with the provisions of the EC Treaty and the
ESCB Statute (Article 3 par. 1).
Similarly, the changes in the discount rate and the interest on advances should
be decided by the Governor of the Bank of Italy until the date of  introduction of
the euro in Italy. Thereafter,  the power of decision must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of the ESCB Statute (Article 6 par. 1).
Likewise, the foreign exchange reserve assets should be transferred from the
Bank of Italy to  the European Central Bank in conformity with the provisions of
the ESCB  and ECB Statute (Article 7 par. 1)34.
Furthermore, Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998 regulated the issuing
of money by the Bank of Italy after Italy’s adoption of the single currency. The
Italian Central Bank may issue banknotes through the authority received from
the European Central Bank (Article 4 par. 1). Similarly, it may mint coins with
the approval of the European Central Bank as for the volume of issue (Article 5
par. 1)35.
Finally, Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998  allowed the Bank of Italy
to carry out central bank operations consistent with the legal framework of the
ESCB, even departing from the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 385 of 1
                                                          
34 Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998 put off  the entry into force of Article 6
and Article 7 par. 1 until the date of adoption of  the single currency by Italy (Article 11 par.
2).
35 Legislative Decree no. 43 of  10 March 1998 put off the entry into force of Article 4
and Article 5 par. 1 and 2 until the date of adoption of the euro by Italy (Article 11 par. 2).
September 1993 and the Bank Statute, during the six months preceding the
introduction of the euro in Italy (Article 9 par. 2)36.
It is worth noting that in the same month in which the Government enacted
Legislative Decree no. 43, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) issued the
convergence report required by Article 121 (ex Article 109 J) of the EC
Treaty37. In this report, it made an assessment of the compatibility of national
legislation, including the statute of the national central bank, in the Member
States with the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute. As regards Italy, EMI
expressed a positive opinion on the state of adaptation of the Italian legislation,
including the Statute of the  Bank of Italy, to the EC Treaty and the ESCB
Statute.
2.1.4  Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998
Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 199838 was enacted after Italy was
admitted to the third stage of Monetary Union by the Council meeting at the
level of the Heads of State and Government (3 May 1998).
First of all, it dealt with the index-linking parameters that would cease to exist
following the introduction of the single currency. They should be replaced
automatically by the new index-linking parameters adopted by the market as
substitutes (Article 2 par. 2)39. As for the index-linking parameters that could not
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(Article 10 par. 1).
37 European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report, March 1998.
38 Published in Official Gazette no. 157 of  8 July 1998. For a comment on this law,
see RONFINI F., supra note 27, pp. 44 et seq..
39 Legislative decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 left it up to a subsequent decree of the
Minister of the Treasury to declare the replacement of the old index-linking parameters with
the new ones. In conformity with this provision, the Decree of the Minister of the Treasury of
23 December 1998 (published in Official Gazette no. 302 of 29 December 1998)  declared
be replaced automatically, they should be determined by an arbitrator or, if the
value of the legal instrument concerned is over 500,000,000 lira, by a panel of
three arbitrators  (Article 2 par. 3).
Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 also stated that as of 1 January
1999, the date of introduction of the euro in Italy, for a maximum period of five
years, the Bank of Italy must periodically fix a rate to replace the superseded
official discount rate, for use in legal instruments that make reference to the
official discount rate (Article 2 par. 1).
Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 also established how the amounts
resulting after conversion of lira into euro must be rounded off, with special
reference to  intermediate calculations (Article 3 and Article 4 par. 1).
Furthermore, it established how the capital and par value of each quota or share
must be modified as a consequence of  the adoption of the single currency.   In
particular, it stated that the capital of limited companies (società per azioni)
cannot be less than 100,000 euros, while the capital of limited liabilities
companies (società a responsabilità limitata) cannot be less than 10,000 euros;
and the capital contribution must be 1 euro or its multiples  (Article 4 par. 2).
These provisions apply to the companies established after 1 January 1999 with
the capital expressed in euros. The pre-existing companies and the companies
established after 1 January 1999 with the capital expressed in lira continue to be
subject to Article 2327 and Article 2474 of the Italian civil code, which fix the
minimum capital of limited companies and limited liabilities companies as
200,000,000 lira and 20,000,000 lira respectively. Nevertheless, the pre-existing
companies and the companies established after 1 January 1999 with capital
expressed in lira, which respect Article 2327 and Article 2474 of the Italian civil
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the replacement of  the Rome Interbank Offered Rate (Ribor) with the Euro Interbank Offered
Rate  (Euribor) as of 30 December 1998.
code, are automatically in conformity with the provisions of the above
mentioned legislative decree, since 1 euro corresponds to 1936.270 lira40.
Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 also dealt with the redenomination
of debt instruments in euros. It ordered the redenomination in euros on 1 January
1999 of government securities denominated in lira issued under Italian law and
negotiable on regulated markets (Article 5 par. 1). It allowed the Ministry of the
Treasury to redenominate in euros its international debt instruments,
denominated in the other currencies participating in the third stage of Monetary
Union, if  the issuing Member States have already redenominated in euros their
public debt, previously denominated in their respective currency and issued
under their national law (Article 6).
 Furthermore, the above mentioned legislative decree ordered the
redenomination in euros on 1 January 2002 of the public debt instruments not
negotiable on the regulated markets (Article 9 par. 1); and allowed Regions to
redenominate their debt instruments in euros during the transition period (Article
10 par. 1). Similarly, it allowed private companies to redenominate unilaterally
their financial instruments in euros during the transition period (Article 11).
Finally, Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 stated that, as of 1 January
1999, references to the lira and the other currencies participating in the third
stage of Monetary Union, contained in financial instruments that are not
redenominated during the transition period, must be considered references to the
euro and must be expressed  as a conventional quantity corresponding to the
original par value (Article 14).
Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 also regulated the use of the euro by
companies and government departments. As for the use of the euro by
companies, it enabled them to use the euro as unit of  account as of 1 January
1999, while obliging them to do so as of 1 January 2000 (Article 16 par. 1). If
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the euro is used as unit of account, compulsory public financial documents
relating to the transition period can  be drawn up and published in euros (Article
16 par. 2). As for banks, financial companies, insurance undertakings and
companies issuing financial instruments negotiable on the Italian regulated
markets, compulsory public financial documents regarding the transition period
can be drawn up and published in euros, even if  the euro is not used as the unit
of account (Article 16 par. 3). It goes without saying that compulsory public
financial documents after 1 January 2002 shall be drawn up and published in
euros (Article 16 par. 2).
Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 enabled companies to publish their
financial statements in euros as well as in lira during the transition period, in
conformity with the principle “no compulsion, no prohibition”. Obviously, as of
1 January 2002, the financial statements shall be published only in euros (Article
4 par. 4).
As to the use of the euro by government departments, Legislative Decree no.
213 of 24 June 1998 stated that tax returns may be submitted to government
departments with the amounts shown in euros as from the tax period beginning
on 1 January 1999 or closed during 1999 (Article 47 par. 2).   Moreover, during
the transition period, creditors may request payments from government
departments in euros and debtors may make payments to government
departments in euros, when cash is not involved, in conformity with the
principle “no compulsion, no prohibition” (Article 48 par. 1). As far as
individual pecuniary obligations are concerned, requests addressed to
government departments to use the euro as the means of payments must refer to
all payments subsequent to such a request and cannot be revoked (Article 48 par.
2).
Finally, Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 established that, as of 1
January 1999, all criminal and administrative sanctions expressed in lira in the
regulations in force, must be considered expressed in euros as well; and, as of 1
January 2002, shall be converted into euros (Article 51 par. 1 and 2).
2.1.5. Legislative Decree no. 206 of 15 June 1999
As was explained above, Law no. 433 of 17 December 1997 allowed the
Government to issue new legislative decrees, modifying the ones previously
passed on its basis, within two years since its entry into force, in conformity
with the principles and criteria set down in it (Article 1 par. 4)41. In accordance
with this provision, the Government enacted Legislative Decree no. 206 of 15
June 199942, which modified Legislative Decree no. 213 of 24 June 1998 and
added new provisions.
In particular, it prohibited the production, issue and distribution of metallic
objects resembling coins, bearing the words “euro”, “euro cent” or similar
words, or reproducing the design which appears on the common or national
sides of the euro coins; and punished violations of this prohibition with a
pecuniary administrative sanction (Article 3).
2.2 National Law from the EC Perspective
2.2.1  Conflicts between Italian Law and EC Law
The main conflicts between Italian law and EC law with respect to the
introduction of the euro, as pointed out by Italian scholars, are related to the
principle of the continuity of contracts, established by Article 3 of Regulation
no. 1103 of 17 June 1997, on the one hand, and certain well-established
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principles governing contracts enshrined in the Italian civil code, on the other
hand43.
Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997 reads as follows: “The
introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal
instrument or discharging or excusing performance under any legal instrument,
nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an instrument.
This provision is subject to anything which parties may have agreed.”
The principle of the continuity of contracts underpins all the legislative acts
passed to render the Italian legal system consistent with the single currency. It is
no coincidence that the continuity of contracts is the first among the general
principles and criteria that the Italian Government should follow when enacting
legislative decrees concerning the introduction of the euro, according to the
delegating act of the Parliament, contained in Law no. 433 of 17 December 1997
(Article 2)44.
                                                          
43 See SACERDOTI  G., Aspetti giuridici dell’introduzione dell’euro, in Diritto
comunitario e degli scambi internazionali, 1997, p. 341, pp. 347 et seq.; DRAETTA U., L’euro
e la continuità dei contratti in corso, in Diritto del commercio internazionale, 1997, p.3, p. 9
et seq.; VISCO C. / SIMONETTI L., L’euro e il problema della continuità dei contratti, in Diritto
del commercio internazionale, 1998, p. 107, pp. 112  et seq.; RONFINI F., supra note 27, pp.
97 et seq.; DE NOVA G., Il principio di continuità dei contratti dopo l’introduzione dell’euro,
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1998, p. 25, pp. 89 et seq.;  MEZZETTI  C. E., Introduzione dell’euro e contratti in corso di
adempimento, in Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 1999, no. 1, p.75, pp. 86 et seq.; MALATESTA
A., Il principio di continuità dei contratti dopo l’euro al vaglio della disciplina sulle clausole
abusive, in Diritto del commercio internazionale, 1999, no. 1, p. 105, pp. 109 et seq.  
44 See supra par. 2.1.2.
Nevertheless, as was mentioned, Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June
1997 seems to be inconsistent with certain provisions of the Italian civil code45,
as well as with certain provisions of  Law no. 218 of 31 May 1995.
a) The principle of the continuity of contracts and the principle
of supervening excessive hardship (eccessiva onerosità
sopravvenuta)
First of all, Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997  appears to be in
conflict with Article 1467 (Contract involving reciprocal performances –
Contratto con prestazioni corrispettive) of the Italian civil code. According  to
this article, in contracts involving reciprocal performances, if the performance of
one of the parties becomes too onerous because of extraordinary and
unforeseeable events, the party that should carry out it can request the
termination of the contract. The other party can prevent termination by
proposing to modify the contract in order to re-establish the equivalence
between the performances of the parties.
The principle of the continuity of contracts aims at avoiding to identify the
introduction of the euro with an unforeseeable event. Nonetheless, the
replacement of the national currency indicated in the contract with the single
currency represents an unforeseeable event for the parties to the contracts
concluded before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, because the
objective of the single European currency was established by that treaty.
The replacement of the national currency provided  in the contract with the
single currency also constitutes an unforeseeable event for contracts concluded
after the entry into force of the EU Treaty. Until the decision of the EC Council
of 3 May 1998, it was not certain if Italy would participate in the third stage of
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Monetary Union; and until the beginning of the third stage, the conversion rate
of the currencies of the country participating in the euro could not be foreseen46.
It must be pointed out that in some cases, replacement of the national currency
indicated in  the contract with the euro alters the equivalence of the
performances of the parties to the contract. This happens in the case in which a
fixed interest rate is established in the contract. Since the interest rate of the euro
is quite a bit lower than that of the currency of certain States participating in the
third stage of Monetary Union, such as the Italian currency, the replacement of
that currency with the euro may improve the position of the creditor and worsen
the position of the debtor.47
In that event, because of the unforeseeability of the introduction of the euro and
the alteration of the equivalence of the performances of the parties, Article 1467
of the Italian civil code allows the debtor to request termination of the contract.
But this possibility seems to be precluded by the prevalence of EC regulations
over Italian legislation and the consequent application of Article 3 of Regulation
no. 1103 of 17 June 1997.
b) The principle of continuity of contracts and the voidance of
contracts
Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997 also seems to be inconsistent
with Articles 1418 (Causes of voidance of contract – Cause di nullità del
contratto), 1325 (Contract requirements – Requisiti del contratto) and 1421
(Legitimation of voidance proocedings – Legittimazione all’azione di nullità) of
the Italian civil code. According to Article 1418, the contract is void when it
lacks one of the elements indicated in Article 1325, namely the agreement of the
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parties, the cause, the object or, if requested by law under pain of nullity, the
form.
It is interesting to note that in some hypothesis, as a consequence of the
replacement of the national currency indicated in the contract with the single
currency, the contract lacks the cause. In particular, this happens in the case of
currency swaps, in which the parties are obliged to give each other amounts of
money, determined with respect to certain index-linking parameters, in two
different currencies. If these are both currencies of countries participating to the
third stage of Monetary Union, the introduction of the euro makes the contract
lose its cause and, consequently, makes it void48.
In that case, according to Article 1421 of the Italian civil code, the nullity of the
contract can be declared by the judge ex officio or on request of a party. But this
effect is clearly in conflict with the continuity of legal instruments prescribed by
Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997.
c) The principle of continuity of contracts and the
interpretation of contracts
Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997 appears to be in conflict with
Article 1362 (Will of the parties – Intenzione dei contraenti) of the Italian civil
code. According to this article, when interpreting the contract, it is necessary to
determine the common will of the parties and not to consider just the literal
meaning of the words. In order to do so, the overall behavior of the parties, even
subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, must be examined.
On the basis of this provision, the will of the parties to terminate the contract can
be inferred from a general clause providing the right to terminate the contract in
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case of unexpected events concerning the currency of the contract, coupled with
significant behavior of the parties, or even only from such behavior.
In the case of the replacement of the national currency indicated in the contract
with the single currency, however, this possibility seems to be precluded by the
prevalence of EC regulations over Italian legislation and the consequent
application of Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997. This article
seems to allow for termination of the contract only in the case in which the
contract contains an explicit clause providing for termination as a consequence
of the introduction of the euro49.
2.2.2  Redundancies of Italian Law with respect to EC Law
The Italian legislative acts passed to render the Italian legal system consistent
with the single currency do not contain any remarkable repetition of the EC
Treaty and EC regulations concerning the introduction of the euro, namely
Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997, Regulation no. 1466 of 7 July 1997,
Regulation no.1467 of 7 July 1997 and  Regulation no. 974 of 3 May 1998.
The Italian legislator makes reference, where necessary, to the relevant
provisions of the EC Treaty and EC regulations, without restating their content.
Actually, some definitions contained in Article 1 of Legislative Decree no. 213
of 24 June 1998, namely the definitions of “legal instruments”, “conversion
rate”, “transition period” and “redenomination”, are nearly identical to those
contained in Article 1 of Regulation no. 974 of 3 May 1998, but they seem
necessary for a better comprehension of the decree and the identity appears fully
justified by the principle of certainty of law.
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2.3 The Application of the Law
2.3.1  Cases that have come before Italian Courts to date
Till now, no case concerning the application of the EC regulations regarding the
introduction of the euro or the application of the legislative acts passed to render
the Italian legal system consistent with the single currency have come before the
Italian Courts.
2.3.2  Cases likely to come before Italian Courts in the future
A number of cases concerning  the application of the EC regulations regarding
the transition to the third stage of the Monetary Union or the application of the
legislative acts passed to render the Italian legal system consistent with the euro
are expected to be examined by Italian judges in the near future.
The conflicts between Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of 17 June 1997 and the
Italian provisions described above are likely to give origin to a vast case law.
On the other hand, the Italian judges are likely to decide these cases in
conformity with the well-established principle of the prevalence of directly
applicable EC law over national law.
In the Decision 8 June 1984 no. 170 (Granital)50, the Italian Constitutional Court
restated the previous case law, confirming that the directly applicable EC law
prevails over national law by virtue of Article 11 of  the Italian Constitution. It
added that such a prevalence does not involve the inconstitutionality of the
Italian provisions in conflict with the EC ones and does not need to be
ascertained case by case by the Court itself.
According to the Court, the national provisions remain in force; they simply are
not applied to the cases regulated by EC provisions inconsistent with them.
Because of the partial transfer of sovereignty from Italy to the European
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Communities, the Italian legal order withdraws when the EC provisions
inconsistent with them come into consideration. Thus, a real conflict between
the directly applicable EC law and Italian law does not exist51.
Italian judges should conform to this view when deciding cases concerning
provisions of the civil code inconsistent with Article 3 of Regulation no. 1103 of
17 June 1997, with the consequence that they should apply the EC regulation
and not the national provisions inconsistent with it.
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3. Trends Towards Spill Over
by Elena Rigacci Hay
3.1  Fiscal policy
Mario Monti, the current Euro-Commissioner for Competition Policy (formerly
Commissioner for Fiscal Policy) feels that all European countries must
harmonise their fiscal systems in order to “fight dangerous and unfair
competition”52 and to combat unemployment. He envisages fiscal harmonisation
for direct and indirect taxes, while he maintains that decisions related to income
tax may remain in the hands of national states. Monti’s aim is to iron out
possible distortions of the single market that could trigger “harmful” tax
competition among member states53. He considers the states’ reluctance to give
up their national sovereignty over fiscal matters as the main obstacle to the
implementation of his proposal.
Reform of the fiscal system is particularly necessary in Italy where fiscal pressure
accounts for 52% of gross income, which, as Francesco Serao (President of the
National Committee of Italian Professional Accountants) states54, is the highest in
Europe.
Italian President and former Treasury Minister  Carlo Azeglio Ciampi55 feels that
the Italian government will continue to reduce fiscal pressure, respecting its
commitment on fiscal co-ordination (a subject that has been discussed again
without success in Helsinki in December56). However, he thinks that, because of
the Italian public debt57 (2.42 trillion liras)58, the pace of implementation of fiscal
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reforms and the reduction of taxes will be slower59 than in other European
countries.
Andrea Monorchio, Italy’s General Accountant, claims that the Stability Pact’s
commitment to reach an accounting budget equation by 2002 could slow down
Italian fiscal reforms60. To conclude, notwithstanding these difficulties, Italy
seems willing to implement a tax harmonisation with other European countries,
even though an abrupt tax reduction cannot be envisaged.
3.2  Social Policy
Following Italy’s success in joining the EMU in January 1999, Italian social
policies have been strengthened, especially to tackle the most pressing problems
of unemployment, pensions and education.
3.2.1  Employment
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi feels that unemployment is the most urgent problem
which must be dealt with through structural reform of the labour market61.
Tommaso Padoa Shioppa (member of the executive committee of the ECB)
stated at the annual meeting on economy and development organised by
Business International that in order to increase employment and strengthen
occupation policy, reforms of the legal and fiscal system and the administration
must be pursued. Massimo D’Alema, Italy’s Prime Minister, maintains that
there is no direct relationship between participation in EMU and reduction in the
unemployment rate: economic growth and a rise in employment levels should be
pursued through public intervention and major structural reforms62. Therefore it
                                                                                                                                                                                    
58 Ansa, 1 February 1999.
59 Ansa, 11 February 1999.
60 EIU, Italy Country Forecast, 2nd quarter 1999.
61 Ansa, 18 January 1999.
62 Ansa, 19 February 1999.
will be the path of rigor and financial recovery dictated by Maastricht that will
create stronger economies and contribute, even though not directly, to dealing
with the problem of unemployment63.
Economists of the Bank of Italy underline the need to face unemployment
through the implementation of ad hoc policies aimed at increasing demand and
avoiding that national enterprises move their production out of Italy. These
include a lessening of bureaucratic constraints, infrastructural deficits and the
excessive cost of labour64. Moreover, a firm policy directed toward sustaining
investment and balancing resources is envisaged together with a decrease in
fiscal pressure and the cost of pensions and an increase in allocations for
investment in human capital65. The Governor of the Bank of Italy, Antonio
Fazio, feels that economic improvement will be measured in employment
growth and that it should be obtained by cutting down public expenditures,
decreasing the taxation level and favouring salary flexibility66. Luciano
D’Ulizia67, President of the Unione Nazionale delle Cooperative Italiane, also
thinks that the introduction of the Euro alone cannot solve the problem of
unemployment, but that it can trigger structural reforms in order to comply with
Maastricht targets. Furthermore some economists claim that, in order to avoid
future “asymmetrical shocks”, national labour policies should be co-ordinated
among member countries and a common labour policy for Europe implemented
to avoid an increase in internal social tension68.
In conclusion, it is generally accepted that the introduction of the Euro is not
expected to create positive effects on employment in the short term. Some even
feel that it may produce a drop in investment and demand together with an
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increase in unemployment, as long as structural reforms are not carried out.
Structural reforms are therefore considered to be the only way to create greater
flexibility on the job market and in investments in infrastructures, productivity,
technology, human capital and know-how.
3.2.2  Pensions
The ECB has also called for reform of the Italian Pension System and especially
for a strengthening of the integrative pension fund system69.
A Eurostat study revealed that Italy has deposited only 1,237 million Euro in
integrative pensions, while Great Britain has deposited 19,400, Germany 15,639,
the Netherlands 8, 499 and Spain 3, 567. Therefore, Italy is moving slower than
the rest of Europe towards integrative pension funds but, as soon as reform of
the pension system begins, the speed should increase70.
Giuliano Amato, current Minister of the Treasury, feels that gradual reform of
the Italian pension system should be carried on through a decrease in the level of
taxation and a shift of some social security payments into integrative pension
funds71.
In Bari, during an assembly of the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL), one of the
three largest Italian trade unions,  Amato renewed his proposal for creating a
pension ceiling, making a solidarity contribution compulsory for the highest
pensions and giving the integrative pension fund system a stronger role72.
Minister of Labour Cesare Salvi confirmed that the decision about the pension
system reform will be implemented by the government next spring, after the
budget for the year 2000 is approved by Parliament.  The budget does not
include any major reform of the pension system, it only envisages a cut in
“golden pensions” and privileges.
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While the government has a positive attitude towards reforms, the Italian trade
unions are divided on the issue. Sergio D’Antoni, Secretary of the
Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) does not completely agree
with this proposal and does not feel that reform of pensions is the most urgent
matter for the government. Instead, Sergio Cofferati, Secretary of the
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), envisages future problems
created by the Italian pension system in 2005-2006: a “dispersion of pension
expenses will soon show its effects: the active labour force will be increasingly
unable to sustain the people who do not work anymore”73. Pietro Larizza, the
Secretary of UIL, feels that an agreement between the government and the trade
unions to bring about a full reform of the pension system is a conditio sine qua
non for reforms to take place.
3.2.3  Education
At a Conference at Luiss University in Rome, the Governor of the Bank of Italy,
Antonio Fazio74 declared that, in order to compete with European partners, it is
urgent that Italy improves its education system; he was referring both to school
and to vocational training. He claimed that people with a University diploma
represent only 30% of the labour force compared to the EU average of 60% and
that the average Italian graduate finds a job only years after graduation.
During a conference organised by the Lombardy Region, Minister for
Community Affairs Enrico Letta declared that reforms in the Italian education
system should be carried out. In his opinion, new EU structural funds75 must be
used to make Italy more responsive to the real needs of the labour market as
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well as to strengthen the knowledge of languages, computer skills and technical
capacity.
3.3  Co-ordination of macroeconomic policy and monetary policy
Many feel that the common European monetary policy is deeply affecting the
pace towards a common European macroeconomic policy. The mechanisms for
economic convergence envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability
Pact are important tools to create harmonisation of European economies. In fact,
the economies of the European countries are still very different in structure and
dynamism, and a unified monetary policy therefore requires a more co-ordinated
and integrated economic policy among member countries in order to produce
positive results.76 Structural reforms of European economic systems are
therefore being put in place in many countries. In addition, tools must be
strengthened that allow for the sharing of information on the economic and
budgetary policies of member states in order to formulate monetary and
economic policies at the European level that are co-ordinated with national
macroeconomic policies.
Franco Modigliani and Giorgio La Malfa77 maintain that, in order to implement
more effective monetary policies, the ECB’s aims must go beyond upholding
prices to taking decisions related to economic policies for labour, fiscal and
budgetary matters.
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Cesare Romiti78 feels that the single monetary policy creates the need for strict
economic co-ordination among European countries: in his view, monetary
policies and budget policies must be co-ordinated with macroeconomic policies.
He feels that common macroeconomic policies will be possible only after the
Italian economic system has been reformed. He calls for liberalisation in the
services sector (energy, transport, telecommunications); less rigidity in
regulation of the labour market and salary structure; lower fiscal pressure to
finance the welfare system; a reduction in the heavy barriers in the national legal
system. Furthermore, he feels that macroeconomic policies should be
independent of national governments because of tighter linkages with the
monetary policies of the ECB.
It is generally accepted that the Euro 11 is the place where a common economic
policy will be created and implemented. Before that, national economic policy
choices will be submitted to Community verification, evaluations and
expressions of approval. Especially during economic crisis, co-ordination among
the economic policies of the states is required. For example, fiscal policy, a
particular aspect of macroeconomic policy, is still decided and approved by
European states’ Parliaments, but a European vision already seems to have
matured: the French government has stated that budget deficits should be
counted as an overall budget deficit of the EU.
3.4  External Projection of the Euro
Art. 111 (ex art. 109), of the Maastricht Treaty regulates international monetary
relations, presenting two main cases. The article envisages possible international
exchange agreements linking the Euro with principal currencies (dollar and yen)
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and, in case of no such agreement, sets out the possibility for the Council of
Ministries to propose broad guidelines for the exchange rate policy.
Francesco Papadia and Carlo Santini79 feel that European political authorities, in
exercising their responsibilities for exchange rates and related matters, are
obliged to follow the European Central Bank’s directions. At the political level,
the European political authority can take decisions related to exchange regimes,
but the ECB maintains full autonomy to conduct exchange policies, a particular
aspect of monetary policy. The ECB therefore has exclusive responsibility over
monetary and exchange policy, its main objective being the maintenance of
price stability. Therefore governments can suggest possible exchange policies,
but the ECB will take suggestions into consideration only in so far as it can act
in coherence with its main objective of price stability (inflation rate below 2%).
Up to now, there has been a good degree of co-ordination between national
governments and the ECB. The main foreign currencies fluctuate among
themselves and do not produce any kind of constraints because the average
inflation rate of the Euro countries is around 1%.
Some criticism, especially from the US Federal Reserve, has been related to the
absence of a single central authority for exchange rate policies. Indeed, neither
ECOFIN, nor the Commission are granted this power. It is envisaged that the
Euro 11 may, in the future, become the central authority for exchange policy.
In the view of Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, responsible for the Analyses and Planning
Division of the European Monetary Institution, a single European currency will
have a positive impact on integration. First, the possibility of carrying out trade
transactions in one’s own currency will remove the risk of exchange rate
fluctuation and will protect prices from inflation.  Second, the Euro may become
an international monetary reserve, like the dollar, and therefore, a means of
payment and investment abroad. Third, the Euro may influence European
markets and currency interest rates. Fourth, the Euro could become a powerful
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tool in influencing world economic and financial policies, gaining a new role in
the international monetary system and thereby limiting the role of the dollar.
These hopes for the future of the Euro seemed momentarily dismissed from the
rapid fall of the single European currency at the beginning of December, and
especially when, on 3rd December, it reached value 0,9997 against the dollar.
Notwithstanding this, the European Central Bank continues to express a positive
stance for the future of the Euro, as well as the Italian financial institutions.
Italian analysts have difficulties in explaining the reasons for the fall of the
currency, since the European economy is recovering. They continue to underline
the need to strengthen economic reforms in Italy, especially decreasing fiscal
pressure and eliminating protectionist measures. Italian politicians did not
express concern over the decrease of the value of Euro80. Piero Fassino, the
Italian Minister for Commerce, even envisaged positive effects for Italian export
outside Europe thanks to an increase of its competitiveness. Fassino retains that
“the decrease of the value of the Euro should not be considered a factor of
weakness, but the outcome of the normal trend of exchange rates”.
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